

Chapter Two

FALAISE

I. Delaying Actions (11 - 18 Aug 44)

41. While Seventh Army was making preparations for a counterattack on Avranches, it became apparent that the approach of US forces toward the Mortain--Alençon line presented a growing threat to the Army's south flank. For this reason Seventh Army shortened its front line, thus making troops available for the protection of the flanks and the rear. Accordingly, LXXXIV Inf Corps withdrew during the night of 11/12 Aug 44 to the line La Lande-Vaumont--heights west of Vengeons--Sourdeval. (For the commitment of 353 Inf Div on 12 Aug 44, see App 1.)

42. On 12 Aug 44, US forces tried to break through the new front. Several tank-supported attacks astride the Gathemo--Vengeons road achieved only small and unimportant gains to the east in the La Haule--Vengeons area. Similar US attacks took place east and south of the Division sector, but they did not alter the over-all situation in any way.

43. In order to further shorten the front and relieve forces, LXXXIV Inf Corps was withdrawn to the area northwest of

Tinchebray--Truttemer-le-Grand--north of Domfront, during the night of 12/13 Aug 44. (See App 2.) About this time Division received an infantry regiment (Obst von Dobeneck) from 331 Inf Division. I do not recall its exact number, or the date of transfer. This regiment was fresh and was at full combat strength in men and materiel.

44. During 13 Aug 44, several attacks took place in the Truttemer-le-Grand area. They resulted in small penetrations, which could be sealed. The situation was worse on 14 Aug 44, for the dominating heights near St Sauveur de Chaulieu were lost, and US forces succeeded in penetrating the forest east of that town. US forces also attacked from the direction of La Lande-Vaumont, and achieved penetrations.

45. Division had suffered heavy losses. These were replaced, to a certain extent, by the timely arrival of a marsch (repl transfer) battalion consisting of men "on leave from Norway." The regiment of Obst von Dobeneck (from 331 Inf Div), just attached to Division, was badly cut to pieces in its first commitment. On the night of 14/15 Aug 44, Division was relieved by order of LXXXIV Inf Corps and withdrawn to the area of Tinchebray because its position was no longer tenable. (For new position, see App 3.)

On 15 Aug 44, FS Jg Rgt 6 (Obstlt von der Heydte) was transferred out of the Division. It was to be evacuated to the area of Nancy for reorganization.

46. By now the danger to Seventh Army's rear and flanks had developed still further, and withdrawal movements were continued. (For position occupied during the night of 15/16 Aug 44, see App 4.) During 16 Aug 44, US forces made several local penetrations in the vicinity of Flers. A heavy enemy assault, launched in the south from the Forêt d'Andaine, threatened the rear of 353 Inf Division. It was necessary to withdraw infantry from the front and to hold them in readiness behind the left wing of the division. Both commanders and troops were glad when evening came and Division could withdraw to the east, on orders from LXXXIV Inf Corps. (For the position on 17 Aug 44, see App 5.)

47. During this new disengaging movement, LXXXIV Inf Corps withdrew the main body of 84 Inf Div, so that the unit could afford protection against the threatening encirclement of Seventh Army. A regimental Kampfgruppe of that Division was left behind in the Briouze sector, on 17 Aug 44, and placed under the command of 353 Inf Division. (The number of the regiment and the name of the commanding officer are forgotten.) Briouze was easily defended frontally, because the Marais du Grand Haze lay west of it. However, on the southern flank little could be done. A panzer division was supposed to have made contact there, but its troops could not be found. On 17 Aug 44, US forces were feeling their way from the south, toward Pointel, which placed the Kampfgruppe of 84 Inf Div in a difficult position. By personal action at Briouze, the Commander of 353 Inf Div so succeeded in organizing and stiffening

the defense that further encirclement from the south was prevented. In the evening of 17 Aug 44, the shattered Kampfgruppe of 84 Inf Div was ordered back to its division by LXXXIV Inf Corps.

48. It was impossible for the weakened units to continue defending an inflexible MLR. To facilitate the defense, the Commander of 353 Inf Div reorganized the Division for commitment according to a plan embodying the following four positions: the MLR (preceded by combat outposts if possible), second position, artillery positions, and a third position.

The first and second positions were occupied; the third position had been reconnoitred and prepared by a reconnaissance staff. Although penetrations could no longer be eliminated on the MLR, these thrusts could be contained effectively in the second position. In the event of a successful enemy breakthrough, the troops in the first position were withdrawn to the third, after contact had been established with adjacent units. This arrangement proved to be successful and was retained for the future.

II. Orne River Crossing

49. The night of 17/18 Aug 44 brought the crossing of the Orne River, with orders from LXXXIV Inf Corps to take up a position on the east bank. The withdrawal was made over a stretch of road which was relatively long, considering the short summer night in which the march had to be made. The routes of approach and crossing sites were under heavy harassing fire from US artillery.

The banks of the Orne are so steep and so high that troops, although marching on foot, were compelled to use the roads and crossings.

(The bed of the river is about 130 meters above sea level, with the banks rising sharply from the river bed to a height of 200 meters.)

The Division chose a crossing at a bridge away from any town, near a mill, where artillery fire was least bothersome. (I cannot give its exact location, but App 6 shows approximately where it was.)

50. As twilight began to fall, the Division Commander, personally, went to the immediate vicinity of the crossing. As it grew dark, US forces increased their artillery fire on the Orne so that it blanketed the entire deeply-cut river. The road was blocked several times by shot-up vehicles or dead horses and continually had to be opened by clearing units. There were also losses in personnel. Hptm Walker, Adjutant of Gren Rgt 984 and an important officer, was killed. By the beginning of daylight, the main body of the Division had completed the crossing and only a small rear guard was left on the enemy side. US fighter-bombers went into action at dawn against movements east of the Orne.

51. The character of the terrain changed suddenly from that to which the troops had been accustomed. Whereas hedges, walls, trees, and bushes had offered excellent protection against aerial observation from Cherbourg--Brest to the Orne, the terrain east of the river was open. Here I saw columns shot up by fighter-bombers and losses in men, vehicles and horses on a scale unknown since the beginning of the invasion. The troops were greatly impressed by the

new situation. Soon after it became light, artillery fire ceased and the attacking planes, which had been active and had found good targets only at early dawn, disappeared. The troops had a couple of hours in which to rest. (For new position, see App 6.)

III. Between the Orne and the Vie (18 - 20 Aug 44)

52. In the meantime, 363 Inf Div had been withdrawn from the western sector of the Seventh Army front, to protect Army's rear. This thinning process made contact and mutual support impossible along the front, and thus US forces were soon on the eastern bank of the Orne. Only painstakingly and with heavy losses was it possible for the Division (Ed: the German is ambiguous here, but apparently 353 Inf Div is meant) to withdraw during daylight hours to the Argentan--Morteaux--Coulboeuf railroad. The withdrawal was possible only because US fighter-bombers did not appear. (See App 7 and App 8.)

In compliance with orders from Seventh Army, 353 Inf Div was transferred on 18 Aug 44 from LXXXIV Inf Corps to II FS Corps.

53. News from the rear became more and more threatening on that day. The British had taken Trun, while US troops had pushed northward east of Forêt de Gouffern. The situation had been exploited. Division regarded the matter very seriously, since in the face of this crisis it was no longer under the clear, purposeful command of LXXXIV Inf Corps, but under a corps which, as a Luftwaffe unit, did not

inspire the same confidence as would a unit of the Heer. Furthermore, it proved impossible to set up telephone communication with II FS Corps.

54. During the night of 18/19 Aug 44, the Division main body was withdrawn to the western edge of Bois de Feuillet and Forêt de Gouffern. Only combat outposts remained along the railroad. On the morning of 19 Aug 44, the II FS Corps gave advance notice that it intended to withdraw behind the Dives during the night of 19/20 Aug 44. It warned that the bank of the Dives might be occupied by the enemy. Division immediately began reconnaissance, which, by noon, yielded the following picture: Villebadin was occupied by the enemy and German columns of all types were streaming from the west to the crossings at Chambois and St Lambert sur Dives. These columns were as much as a km broad (sic). Trun and the east bank of the Dives south of it were in enemy hands.

55. On the afternoon of 19 Aug 44, II FS Corps ordered that a breakout from the pocket be made on the night of 19/20 Aug 44. The following units were to break out: 3 FS Div, via Magny, south of Trun; and 353 Inf Div, via St Lambert sur Dives. All vehicles were to be sent out of the pocket via Chambois. In the meantime, however, Chambois and St Lambert sur Dives fell into the hands of the enemy. The Division Commander therefore decided to break out with his main body at Chambois in order to protect his vehicles from the danger of being captured, and to have only Kfgr Heinz (Gren Rgt 984) and the rear guard (Gren Rgt 942) break out at St Lambert,

56. During the day the south flank of Division became more and more endangered. Therefore, Division entrusted Pi Kp 353 with the protection of the south flank on the southern edge of the Forêt de Gouffern, south of the command post of Division. The Company had hardly arrived there when XLVII Pz Corps took it under its command. Division learned of this only belatedly and, consequently, only a few of these engineers were seen again. (For the formation taken up by Division at dusk, see App 9.)

57. Gren Rgts 941, 984 and von Dobeneck assembled as soon as darkness fell. The following units were supposed to make the break-out: Gren Rgt 941, via Chambois, followed by Obst von Dobeneck's regiment; Gren Rgt 984, via St Lambert sur Dives, followed by the rear guard, Gren Rgt 942. The objective assigned was the western slope of Mont Ormel. Division Headquarters intended to reach Mont Ormel via Chambois.

58. Because of terrain difficulties, Tournay sur Dives could not be by-passed. The village was in flames and the streets were completely blocked by destroyed vehicles, dead horses, and immobilized tanks. Clearance work delayed the march through the village by three hours. Every five minutes a sudden concentration of artillery fire hit the town's eastern edge, but not the main thoroughfare, so that the movement took place without losses. At Tournay sur Dives. the Division Commander took charge of three tanks which were lost from their unit. The wounded commander of 3 FS Div, Genlt Schimpf, was taken along on one of the tanks. The road

from Tournay sur Dives to Chambois was under artillery fire from the south, but, even here, there were no losses.

59. When the Division Commander at the head of the right column was near Chambois, he found in the hedge terrain at Le Bas Fel several tanks under the command of a staff officer (SS?), who had the mission of clearing up the area of Chambois. These tanks assembled at early dawn, 20 Aug 44. The Division Commander attached his right column to the tanks and, with them, got across the Dives at a nameless locality between Chambois and St Lambert sur Dives. The swift tanks then disappeared, and immediately to the north of the town the gap was again sealed by the enemy.

60. In this nameless locality there were, besides Kfgrs Schmitz and Dobeneck, numerous other soldiers from all divisions in the pocket—soldiers who, as stragglers behind the tanks and 353 Inf Div, succeeded in crossing the Dives. The Division Commander reorganized the units and formed Kampfgruppen. It did not take long for the enemy artillery to discover that this section of the town was in German hands, and heavy fire began to fall on the crowded town. Losses occurred, the Kampfgruppen which had been organized in the emergency were scattered, and great confusion resulted. In spite of everything, we finally succeeded in reorganizing the main body of the troops to some extent. (See App 10.)

61. Near the town, soldiers hid behind bushes and waited in gullies. Patrols reconnoitering toward the southeast encountered Americans; toward the north, British; and toward the northeast,

Churchill tanks. The Division Commander decided to use two German tanks, found during the reorganization, for a breakthrough in the narrow gap between the British and Americans. These tanks had hardly left the town when both were knocked out by fire from Churchill tanks. The improvised Kampfgruppen lay under cover without initiative; they had had their fill of fighting; they were tired and discouraged.

62. The Division Commander took about a dozen brave-looking men and reconnoitered a covered path running approximately eastward (see App 10). He came under fire from a Churchill tank but received only a slight head wound, so that he could still direct the evacuation of Kfgr Schmitz over the path reconnoitered. Thus, at least the men escaped from the pocket. Vehicles and guns fell into the hands of the enemy; only two or three Volkswagens got through. Numerous wounded men and other soldiers, among them some from Division Headquarters, were taken prisoner by the enemy.

63. The open area north of Frenée was overcrowded with soldiers of the Heer, Luftwaffe, and SS, soon after the spearheads of the Division had broken through. Everyone pressed toward Mont Ormel, which rises high above the open plain. (Dives valley lies about 90 meters above sea level; Mont Ormel, about four km from the Dives, is about 250 meters high.) A US artillery liaison plane hovered over the open terrain and directed artillery fire on the retreating troops.

64. The units were reorganized on Mont Ormel as follows: Kfgr Schmitz (including all soldiers of the Heer), Kfgr FS, and Kfgr SS. I do not remember the names of the commanders of Kfgr FS and Kfgr SS.

Kfgr Dobeneck had apparently lost its way; it veered north and was incorporated into another division. Furthermore, Division had no contact with Gren Rgt 984 (Obst Heinz) or with the rear guard. Although Gren Rgt 984 later contacted the Division (about 21 or 22 Aug 44), Gren Rgt 942, including its commander, Maj Engel, remained unaccounted for. (For the troop dispositions on Mont Ormel, see App 11.)

65. Neither adjacent units nor higher headquarters were to be found. Kfgr SS, however, reported that British armored reconnaissance elements were present in the woods north of the mountain. A few security elements, furnished by panzer divisions (I can no longer remember which divisions), were on the Vie. Division therefore decided to fall back behind the Vie and gave orders to put the Kampfgruppen on the march. Kfgrs Schmidt and FS arrived at the correct time; Kfgr SS was missing. Having gotten out of the pocket, it had marched away, without carrying out the order given it—to proceed to the Vie and take up positions there. Officers of Division Headquarters searched in vain until darkness to find the SS. Presumably they had moved into billets, leaving the security to soldiers of the Heer and the Luftwaffe.

As a political combat organization, the SS was noted for its audacity, but apparently it lacked the untiring steadfastness—the silent performance of duty by which no laurels can be obtained—which was continually demanded of the Heer. The soldier at the front

naturally asked why, in spite of everything, the members of the SS were in many ways better off than himself. The answer is that a distinction was made between the Wehrmacht and party organizations, favoring the latter. This fact was a source of vexation to the troops, so it can be understood that there were troop commanders who shunned all association and contact with the SS in order that this discrimination might not be flaunted before the eyes of their men. The historian who seeks to find the reasons for the German collapse should not let these facts pass unnoticed.

IV. Aftermath of Falaise

66. The Division Commander sought personal contact with the headquarters of II FS Corps. On his trip he found the headquarters of XLVII Pz Corps and requested that his Division be put under its command. The Corps Commander rejected this proposal because, having just fought his way out of the pocket, he had neither a working staff nor the essential signal equipment.

67. The command post of Seventh Army was in the vicinity of Le Sap, but only the Ia, Obst Helmdach, had arrived there. For the time being, he left the Division on the Vie. Until a corps headquarters should become available, Division was to take its orders directly from Seventh Army. For the next day it was planned that Division be withdrawn from the front and reorganized in the area of Le Sap. Accordingly, Division was withdrawn on 21 Aug 44 to the area Terec--Les Essarts, east of Le Sap. Here numerous stragglers appeared, also the much weakened Gren Rgt 984 and three howitzers of AR 353.

68. The occupation of the position on the Vie, the withdrawal, the march into the area of Le Sap, and the reorganization of the units there took place without enemy interference. No enemy tanks pushed into the shattered, disorganized troops, although such a move would have opened the road to Belgium, nor did fighter-bombers attack the defenseless remnants of the Division.

69. When these trying days were over, the period of occupation of quarters, rest, and reorganization of units felt almost like peacetime. This impression was strengthened by our reception in quarters. The Normans showed neither hate nor vindictiveness. There was no case of assault on soldiers, although at that time they were moving through the land in large numbers, either singly or in small groups. The population showed only pity and was ready to help wherever it could.

V. Bases of Soldier Morale

70. With the Battle of Falaise, the third great battle fought by 353 Inf Div after the beginning of the invasion ended. In the first, the Battle of the Cotentin, the troops held fast in spite of their inferiority because they believed this inferiority to be only temporary. Had not Hitler stated for years that he would master an invasion because he had included every eventuality in his calculations? That is why the soldiers, believing they were fighting to gain time for the movement of reserves and of the Luftwaffe, died on the Cotentin. The result of these sacrifices was that the

Americans did not reach their "D419" (25 Jun 44) objective, the Avranches area, until 31 Jul 44. The German troops on the Cotentin gave the High Command a real gain in time, and did everything possible for a force so inferior in men and materiel.

71. In the second great battle, Avranches, in which US forces opened the door to the interior of France, hopes rose again when the German counterattack began. After the failure to drive the Americans from the Cotentin, an attack on Avranches had to be dared, although there was little hope of success. The troops saw that almost everything had to be staked on one card. All troops will occasionally take a chance if there is any likelihood of success. In spite of their exhausted condition, the men entered this battle confidently; they could not know that there was no chance of success, that their leaders were playing a hopeless game, that the eagerly anticipated commitment of the Luftwaffe would not take place. Only in the course of the battle did the troops learn their bitter lesson. For the first time the soldier on the invasion front suspected (or perhaps fully realized) that he was being used as cannon fodder for Hitler.

Confidence in the military leadership received a terrific jolt. This was unavoidable, since the command had undermined its own reputation earlier by other measures when it shook the confidence of the troops after the humiliation of the unsuccessful 20 Jul 44 plot. The appointment of Himmler as Befehlshaber des

Ersatzheeres (Commander, Replacement Training Army) was received by the Wehrmacht with the deepest shame, which becomes comprehensible in the light of his popular nickname "Unterweltsmarschall" (Marshall of the Underworld). This shame was further heightened by the introduction of the so-called "German salute."

72. Why, then, did the soldier continue to fight after Avranches, in spite of his wavering confidence in the Supreme Command? Could he continue to fight without assuming responsibility for the disaster to his country?

In 1918, when Ludendorff perceived that there was no possibility of a military victory, he demanded an armistice. The officers and men who continued to fight after Avranches and Falaise did so in the belief that even the political leaders of Germany had insight comparable to that of Ludendorff.

In 1918 approximately three months elapsed between the acknowledgment of military defeat and the armistice. Then, a penetration into Germany was successfully avoided. In 1944, everything possible had to be done to protect the Fatherland from the ravages of war before the ultimate defeat. That the government had no intention of ending the war, the soldier who had just taken his third great defeat at Falaise could not know. He therefore passed through this difficult trial and took what followed.

Appendices

353 INF DIV

(24 Jul - 14 Sep 44)

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER

MS # A-984

- App 1: 353 Inf Div: Assembly Area: 24 Jul 44
- App 2: 353 Inf Div: Order of Battle: 25 Jul 44
- App 3: 353 Inf Div: Situation: About Noon 25 Jul 44
- App 4: 353 Inf Div: Counterattack: Afternoon of 25 Jul 44
- App 5: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 0500 Hours 26 Jul 44
- App 6: 353 Inf Div: Developments: 26 Jul 44
- App 7: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Afternoon of 27 Jul 44
- App 8: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Morning of 28 Jul 44
- App 9: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Evening of 28 Jul 44
- App 10: 353 Inf Div: Breakout: Night of 28/29 Jul 44
- App 11: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 29 Jul 44
- App 12: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Afternoon of 30 Jul 44
- App 13: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 31 Jul 44
- App 14: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 1 Aug 44
- App 15: 353 Inf Div: Order of Battle: 5 Aug 44
- App 16: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 5 Aug 44

- App 17: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 6 Aug 44
- App 18: 353 Inf Div: Line of Departure: Night of 9/10 Aug 44
- App 19: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Evening of 10 Aug 44
- App 20: 353 Inf Div: Order of Battle: 11 Aug 44
- App 21: 353 Inf Div Units and Commanders: 11 Aug 44

MS # A-985

- App 1: 353 Inf Div: Commitment: 12 Aug 44
- App 2: 353 Inf Div: Commitment: 13-14 Aug 44
- App 3: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 15 Aug 44
- App 4: 353 Inf Div: Commitment: 16 Aug 44
- App 5: 353 Inf Div (Reinf): Commitment: 17 Aug 44
- App 6: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Morning of 18 Aug 44
- App 7: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Noon 18 Aug 44
- App 8: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Evening of 18 Aug 44
- App 9: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Evening of 19 Aug 44
- App 10: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Morning of 20 Aug 44
- App 11: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Afternoon of 20 Aug 44

MS # A-986


- App 1: 353 Inf Div: Billeting Areas: 21-24 Aug 44
- App 2: 353 Inf Div: Seine Crossing: 24 Aug 44

App 3: 353 Inf Div: Billeting Area: 25-27 Aug 44
App 4: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 29-30 Aug 44
App 5: 353 Inf Div: Situation: 31 Aug 44
App 6: 353 Inf Div: Positions: 1 Sep 44
App 7: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Morning 2 Sep 44
App 8: 353 Inf Div: Situation: About 2 Sep 44
App 9: 353 Inf Div: Commitment: 6 Sep 44
App 10: 353 Inf Div: Commitment: 7 Sep 44

MS # A-987

App 1: 353 Inf Div: Situation: Afternoon 8 Sep 44
App 2: 353 Inf Div: Disposition of Units: 10 Sep 44
App 3: 353 Inf Div: Disposition of Units: 13-14 Sep 44

PREPARED BY EUCOM : HD : OHGB
 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY : 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA



357
117

LEGEND:
 DATA FROM MEMORY
 941, 942, 984 - INF REGTS

MS # A-985 : APP I

**353 INF DIV
 COMMITMENT**

12 AUG 44



GSGS 4249 : 6F, 6G


MS# A-985:APP 2

353 INF DIV COMMITMENT

13-14 AUG 44



GSGS 4249:6F,6G




LEGEND:

DATA FROM MEMORY. NUMBERS & LOCATIONS OF UNITS NOT RECALLED IN ALL CASES.
 A REGT OF 331 INF DIV (OBST VON DOBENECK) PROBABLY SUBORDINATED TO 353 INF DIV.
 ■ ELEVATION IN METERS


PREPARED BY EUCOM:HD:OHGB
 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY: 1st Lt. Robert C. Dart, USA

PREPARED BY FUCOM: HD: OHGB
 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY: 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA



MS #A-985: APP 3

**353 INF DIV
 SITUATION
 15 AUG 44**



GSGS 4249: 6F, 6G, 7F, 7G

LEGEND:

- Elevations in Meters
- Numbers & Locations of Some Units Not Remembered
- Data from Memory

MS# A-985:APP 4

353 INF DIV COMMITMENT


16 AUG 44



GSGS 4249:7F,7G

LEGEND:

■ ELEVATION IN METERS
DATA FROM MEMORY
NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS
OF SOME UNITS NO
LONGER RECALLED



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(FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
APPROVED BY: 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA

MS # A - 985 : APP 5

353 INF DIV (REINF) COMMITMENT


17 AUG 44



GSGS 4249 : 7F, 7G

LEGEND


- ELEVATION IN METERS
- DATA FROM MEMORY
- NUMBERS & LOCATIONS OF SOME UNITS NO LONGER RECALLED
- ONE REGT OF 84 INF DIV WAS SUBORDINATED TO 353 INF DIV ON THE LEFT FLANK
- ? UNKNOWN UNIT



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 APPROVED BY: *1st Lt Robert C. Sant, USA*

MS # A - 985 : APP 6

353 INF DIV SITUATION MORNING OF 18 AUG 44




GSGS 4249: 7F, 7G

LEGEND:

Boundaries approximate
Numbers and locations of some units no longer recalled

- = German Lines
- A = Approximate crossing site
- = Elevation in meters



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MS # A-985 : APP 7

353 INF DIV SITUATION


NOON 18 AUG 44



GSGS 4249 : 7F, 7G

LEGEND

- ▲▲▲ = GERMAN LINES
- ▬▬▬ = ALLIED LINES
- = ELEVATIONS IN METERS
- ⊙ = UNKNOWN UNITS
- BOUNDARIES APPROXIMATE
- NUMBERS & LOCATIONS OF SOME UNITS NO LONGER RECALLED



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 APPROVED BY *1st Lt Robert C. Dant, USA*

MS # A-985:APP 8


353 INF DIV SITUATION EVENING OF 18 AUG 44



GSGS 4249:7F,7G

LEGEND:

- ▲▲▲▲ GERMAN LINES
- ||||| ALLIED LINES
- - ELEVATION IN METERS
- BOUNDARIES APPROXIMATE
- NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF SOME UNITS NO LONGER RECALLED
- ? - UNIT DESIGNATIONS UNKNOWN




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 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY: 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA

PREPARED BY EUCOM : HD : OHGB
 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY : 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA

LEGEND

- ELEVATION IN METERS
- ▲▲▲ GERMAN LINES
- ▬▬▬ ALLIED LINES
- ▭ MOVEMENT 3 FS DIV




MS # A - 985 : APP 9

**353 INF DIV
 SITUATION
 EVENING OF 19 AUG 44**





G S G S 4 2 4 9 : 7F, 7G, 8F

M. T.



PREPARED BY EUCOM : HD : OHGB
 (FROM A SKETCH BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY : 1st Lt. Robert C. Sart, USA



- LEGEND**
- BREAKOUT
 - ① - KFGP VON DOBENECK
OBST VON DOBENECK
 - ② - KFGP SCHMITZ
OBST SCHMITZ

MS # A-985 : APP 10

**353 INF DIV
 SITUATION**

MORNING OF 20 AUG 44

KILOMETERS


GSGS 4347 : 43/12SW

FORET DE GOUFFERN

PREPARED BY EUCOM : HD : OHGB
 (FROM AN OVERLAY BY GENLT MAHLMANN)
 APPROVED BY: 1st Lt Robert C. Dart, USA

LEGEND:

- ▲▲▲▲ = GERMAN LINES
- ▬▬▬▬ = ALLIED LINES
- = ELEVATION IN METERS



MS # A - 985 : APP II

**353 INF DIV
 SITUATION
 AFTERNOON OF 20 AUG 44**



G S G S 4249 : 7F, 8F