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WALTER STEINMUELLER

Generalleutnant

Feb/Apr 1947

OPERATIONS OF

THE 331 INFANTRY DIVISION

from the end of July to the beginning of September 1944

and

THE 70 INFANTRY DIVISION (under the Command of the Staff of the 331 Inf Div)

from 8 to 22 September 1944

Translated by:

C. l'Orsa

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OPERATIONS OF

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of the Staff of the 331 Inf Div)

from 8 to 22 September 1944

I. Employment in the area Calais-Boulogne

(July 1944)

When I took over the command of the 331 Inf Div, the middle of July 1944, this division was located in the area of Calais-Boulogne as a reserve division. It was committed in the second line of defense (see Appendix 1).

Organization of the Division:

Three Gren Rgts (557, 558, 559).

each composed of two battalions, one Inf howitzer company, one antitank company (7.5 cm) and one signal communication platoon.

The 331 Artillery Rgt.

With four battalions (three light and one medium) and one headquarters battery.

Engineer battalion.

Fuesilier battalion.

Antitank battalion.

With one assault gun company (11 guns), one antitank company (7.5 cm motorized) and one antiaircraft defense company (12 guns (3.5 cm) on self-propelled mounts).

Signal battalion.

Field replacement training battalion.

Medical battalion. and

Supply troops.

The 331 Inf Div had been committed in the east until the spring of 1944 and was then transferred to the Zone of Interior for reorganization and from the beginning of summer had been located at the Channel front line.

The personnel of the Div was 50% composed of young battle-experienced soldiers and 50% of young age class replacements. The fighting qualities were good. At the Channel front, there was opportunity for training in units up to company strength. The officers were trained in map exercises and terrain appreciation in the field. The Div was well equipped and still possessed reserves. On the whole, the Div was to be ranked with those of the first wave.

The mission of the Division ran as follows:

To improve and hold the second line of defense in the event of an enemy landing. March readiness of the infantry for commitment into other front sectors within six hours, the animal drawn elements within 12 hours.

II. Advance to the Seine and operations south of it.

(28 July)

On 28 July, the order to evacuate the Div arrived. On the same evening the entraining began.

The Division was to be assembled in the area east of Rouen. I asked permission of my superior command headquarters to have the Div reach its march destination on foot. This was refused (Appendix 2).

During the following night, I travelled on ahead and reported at LXXXI Inf Corps at Rouen, to which the Division was assigned while in the assembly area. The division Hq was at Vandrimare.

What I had feared, happened. The transports loaded during the following days were attacked by fighter bombers and suffered considerable losses. Sections of the railroads were destroyed, so that the transports had to be detoured, causing long delays and usually had to be detrained far away from the railroad station at their destination. In spite of using every means of signal communication and many Ordonndag offiziere (special-missions staff officers), I was unable, sometimes for days, to locate the whereabouts of some transports. The sequence in arrival of march groups was completely disorganized.

The 558 Gren Rgt, assembled first, and the assault gun company, had to immediately begin crossing over the Seine. Four to five ferry-sites between Rouen and Andelys had been assigned to the whole Division.

One battalion of the 557 Gren Rgt followed these advanced elements. Corps, Seventh Army and OB WEST urged greatest speed.

However, the Division was spread out over 200 km and transmission of communications was almost impossible.

On 3 and 4 August, the elements which had crossed first (elements of the 55th Gren Rgt not animal-drawn and the one battalion of the 557 Gren Rgt) were transported and brought forward to Seventh Army. Furthermore, the assault-gun company had to be started on the march. From that moment on, there was no further connection with those elements. They were committed at the front line and annihilated. The Division never again saw anything of these elements.

Higher headquarters continued urging more speed.

On 5 August, I decided to drive on ahead to Seventh Army and personally report on the situation of the Division. The development of the situation following the enemy break-through near Avrange, also induced me to make the trip. Seventh Army was encircled in the south, enemy armored spearheads advanced towards Alencon and Mortagne and the 331 Inf Div was the only combat troop located north of this area. However, this division had become greatly spread out, during its forced march to the front line, and was not ready for defense.

During the night of 5/6 August, I suggested to Army to bring forward and assemble the 331 Inf Div in the area of Gacé-Laigle and to have the elements, already located there, first secure the road-junctions of Gacé, St. Cauburge and Laigle.

The commander-in-chief agreed with my suggestion.

The necessary measures could just be carried out in time, for already on 7 Aug the first enemy armored reconnaissance vehicles were repelled near Gacé. On 8 Aug, enemy tanks, followed by mounted

infantry, pushed forward to Gacé and came under concentrated fire of an Arty Bn. The enemy battalion was dispersed.

On 9 Aug, the first enemy thrusts, taking place against St. Gaulurge and Laigle. were repelled.

The enemy armored Div--first a French one later a Canadian one--shifted their assaults more and more to the east.

The 331 Inf Div received reinforcements from elements of the 6 FS Div, which were committed in the area south of Laigle, so as to extend the divisional left wing.

In this situation, the responsibility for the sector of Laigle--Verneuil--Dreux as far as Eure, was also transferred to me. For this purpose, I was given authority to stop all units which were on their march to the front line, to place them under my command and to commit them (Appendix 3).

It was most opportune that first, an SS Pz Bn (Wahl) arrived with 11 tanks and 3-400 transported infantry men. This well armed and very mobile battalion, which was on its way to the Fifth Pz Army, received the mission to secure the sector of Laigle-Dreux. They accomplished this mission with care, tenacity, and energy until the arrival of the 344 Inf Div (Appendix 3).

Furthermore, I took command of a SS Pz Pi Bn (motorized) and many small units which I incorporated.

While my left wing was reasonably well secured, my right wing was exposed. Enemy armored forces could push forward without hindrance to the north, passing west of Gacé. In order to cut off these

enemy forces, the remnants of several Pz Divs were to push forward on 14 Aug (?) from the west towards Sees, while the 331 Inf Div was to reach Sees--by attacking with its right wing. The attack was stopped in front of Nonant-le Pin. For reasons unknown to me, the Pz Divs did not commence operations, so that the entire enemy defense was able to concentrate on the division's attack. The captured terrain could be held, but the attack had been useless.

On 14 Aug the 344 Inf Div took over the sector west of Laigle and with it also the Pz Bn Wahl which had been reinforced in the meantime.

Enemy reconnaissance activity increased along the whole front line from day to day. Heavier enemy thrusts against St. Gauburge and Laigle were repelled. The enemy pressure on Lisieux and the sector of Tongues, with the loss of Gacé, which had been captured from northwest, induced the Higher command to give up the salient south and southeast of Gacé.

On 18 Aug (19?) the front line was withdrawn (Appendix 3).

On 19 Aug, the enemy attacked the sector of the 344 Inf Div and captured Breteuil.

On 20 Aug, he advanced towards Lyre and Conches and took the latter. Then the 331 Inf Div was threatened on its exposed left flank. The Fuesilier-Bn and other elements pulled out from the front line, occupied the Risle sector to prevent the enemy from crossing the Risle river towards the west.

On the evening of 20 Aug, the LXXXI Inf Corps ordered a withdrawal of the front line to the line of Lyre-Conches. The 331 Inf Div

received the mission to re-establish contact with the 344 Inf Div. For this purpose, the replacement training battalion had to be committed east of the Risle.

The 344 Inf Div was assigned to me.

The enemy attack in the direction of Neubourg-Bourgtheroulde indicated his intention to cut off from the Seine and encircle all elements west of the Risle. The battered remnants of the 344 Inf Div first had to be assembled and reorganized. At that time they possessed no defensive power. The enemy drive beyond Neubourg had to be prevented by all means.

The replacement training battalion was already committed southeast of Beaumont to establish contact with the 344 Inf Div. However, contact could not be made.

A Kampfuerband under the commander of the SS Pi Bn was hurriedly organized and thrown against Neubourg. This Kampfuerband composed of: The Staff of the Pi Bn (motorized); two Pi Cos (motorized); one motorized Arty Bn (from the combat unit of the 6 FS Div); one motorized Pi Co of the 331 Inf Div, and some antitank guns (7.5) (motorized). The commander of the Kampfuerband immediately moved on ahead with a portion of his battalion, organized the construction of a defensive front line southeast and south of Neubourg and issued instructions to other elements of his Kampfuerband upon their arrival. The commander (whose name I cannot recall) accomplished his task excellently.

Even while the front line was being established, the Kampfuerband had contact with the enemy. Enemy reconnaissance was followed

by attacks against Neubourg, which were repelled with heavy losses for the enemy.

The enemy did not make full use of his successes beyond Conches, and so the way to the Seine remained open for several German divisions.

No contact with the 17 Lw Feld Div existed. Elbeuf and the front line south of it was held by the remnants of several Pz Divs of Fifth Pz Army which had been sent there via Montfort. There was only loose contact with these elements, which were overrun in the course of the next few days by the enemy as he succeeded in driving forward towards Bourgtheroulde.

The point of main effort of the defense was then placed on the division's left wing, which caused a reorganization of the Div. All elements that could possibly be released, were pulled out from the old line and put on march for the new front line east of the Risle. Thus the defensive front line between Beaumont and Neubourg was reinforced from hour to hour.

The LXXXI Inf Corps, on the same day, ordered the withdrawal of the elements west of the Risle into the sector east of the river. The 331 Inf Div received the mission to defend the sector up to and including Neubourg with its right wing at the Risle.

The replacement training Bn, committed southeast of Beaumont to prevent enemy thrusts in a northwestern direction, covered the departure of the troops west of the Risle and repelled repeated enemy attacks. During these battles, this battalion was completely annihilated.

21/22 August

The night march of troops being transferred turned out to be most difficult. Road jams, lasting for hours, were caused by the inserting of elements from other divisions, coming from the west, and it was only due to the energetic handling by the march group commanders that the important sector was hastily improvised for defense in the course of the forenoon of 22 Aug.

On 22 Aug, the enemy, with a strong armored unit, attacked the right wing of the Division and pushed it back. At the same time, he launched an attack in the neighboring sector northeast of Neubourg and pushed back this front too (Appendix 4).

The remnants of the 344 Inf Div assembled in the area northwest of Neubourg and were organized there into a reinforced regimental group.

A renewed enemy attack against Bourgtheroulde, on 23 Aug, resulted in a deep penetration. Bourgtheroulde was temporarily lost.

The new and already occupied line of defense, ordered by the Corps, (with its right wing near Brionne) could no longer be held. The Division received an order to withdraw to the line of Montfort-Bourgtheroulde, while continuing its resistance in favorable terrain sectors.

Meanwhile, the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Risle north of Montfort and in winning terrain towards the east.

On 25 Aug, the Division was defending a line running in a protruding curve west of Bourgtheroulde.

The areas within the two bends of the Seine south and southwest of Rouen were filled with vehicles of all kinds. Thus, about 1000 tanks and motor vehicles were parked in the eastern big bend alone, awaiting an opportunity to cross the river. Taking this fact into consideration, these two river bends had to be held at all costs until the crossing of these vehicles had been completed.

The 331 Inf Div was ordered to accomplish this mission (Appendix 5).

On 26 Aug, these two river bends were sealed off.

The following elements were committed:

Within the right bend: The 557 Gren Rgt with subordinated Fuesilier Bn and one light Arty Bn.

Within the left bend: The 559 Gren Rgt to which were subordinated: one light Arty Bn reinforced by a medium battery; the combat team of the 6 PS Div and one regimental group 1053 (from the 95 Inf Div).

Between the bends on the north bank: Regimental group of the 344 Inf Div.

The rest of the artillery was employed north of the Seine in such a manner that it was able to support the defensive combat in front of both bends.

At the ferry sites, the Pi Bn was untiringly active day and night.

The enemy air force tried to harass the crossing by often uninterrupted attacks. However, the losses caused by this were small.

The enemy tried by repeated attacks to pierce through the lines of obstacles in front of the bends, but was repelled again and again. Penetrations were eliminated by counterattacks. The 559 Combat Team had to endure especially heavy operations.

On 28 Aug, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Seine east of Elbeuf. There, he met the exhausted troops of the 17 Lw Feld Div which, however, prevented the enemy from pivoting against Rouen. For immediate protection of the town, units obtained from Rouen were assigned to me and committed south-east of the city. I transferred my command post into headquarters of the Kampfkommandant (combat commander) of Rouen who was subordinated to me.

By 29 Aug, the crossing of all vehicles from the areas within the river bends had been completed, so that the troops engaged in battle there could be withdrawn. The crossing of all these elements was completed during the morning of 30 Aug. During these preparations, no vehicles and no men fell into the hands of the enemy. In this connection, the regimental commanders had completed their tasks with excellent results.

The fighting of the 331 Inf Div south of the Seine was completed; it was the last German division to cross the river.

South of the Seine, the Div had to fight heavy defensive battles and as a result, suffered severe losses. At the Invasion front line, the 558 Gren Rgt, one battalion on the 557 Gren Rgt and the assault-gun company had been completely annihilated. The remaining elements, together with the subordinated units, had suffered heavy losses. However, the cohesion within the Division was maintained and no guns were lost.

The defensive battles within the bends of the Seine, which lasted several days, brought some days of rest for the horses of the animal-drawn units, especially of the artillery. Without these days of rest, the amazing march performances north of the Seine, which then followed, could never have been accomplished.

III. Operations in Northern France, north of the Seine.

At the beginning of these operations, the 331 Inf Div was composed as follows:

The command staff (10% losses);

Ib Staff with supply troops (5% losses);

The 557 Gren Rgt with subordinated Fuesilier Bn (25% losses);

The 559 Gren Rgt with subordinated combat group of the 6 FS Div (25-30% losses);

Regimental group of the 344 Inf Div formed by two battalions (20% losses);

Engineer Bn (15% losses);

Antitank battalion minus assault-gun company (30% losses of men and material);

331 Arty Rgt with four battalions (15% losses), to which was subordinated: one reinforced battery of the 344 Inf Div and one Bn (motorized) of the 6 FS Div.

Signal Bn (25% losses of men and over 50% of material);

Medical Bn (50% ready for action; many vehicles were lost through enemy fighter bomber activity);

Fragmentary elements from Rouen, which remained available as replacements and were led by the Kampfkommandant of Rouen.

The evacuation of the first elements of the Div (supply troops and trains) into the assigned zone of action had already commenced on 28 Aug.

The Corps had ordered several lines of resistance for the defense of the area between the Seine and the Somme (Appendix 6).

These lines were to be occupied in successive alternate positions and evacuated when ordered. Due to the tactical situation of the enemy, this order became obsolete.

The first combat troops that were withdrawn occupied the first line of resistance south-west of Forges-Les Eaux. But the following units already had to move on, in order to cover the south flank of the Division.

The 17 Lw Feld Div, which was to establish and hold our southern flank, was struck deeply in its flank by enemy tanks and those elements which had not been annihilated were pushed into the zone of action of the 331 Inf Div. The cohesion of these units was lost and the remnants were used for replenishing the weakened division units. The assignment of the remnants of the 17 Lw Feld Div took place by order of the Army.

30 August

Thus, the 331 Inf Div had become a Flugeldivision (wing division)* and its deep flanks were threatened by enemy armored forces. The lines of resistance ordered by the Corps had become meaningless. I fully

* (Ed: last division on the Army's southern flank)

realized the importance of the mission for which I had thus become responsible: to cover--so far as this was at all possible--the open flank of the Army on the left, and I acted accordingly.

The extended march group of the Division received orders not to interrupt its retirement. The few march halts that were ordered by the Div, were distributed in such a way as to take place only at important terrain sectors which had to be secured. Enemy thrusts were frequently repelled.

One march group was, while retiring, encircled by enemy tanks east of Rouen. However, it succeeded in fighting its way through and regaining contact.

On 31 Aug the enemy drove against Amiens and captured the Staff of the Army deep in the rear of the Division. Strong enemy forces were on the move in the combat sector to the rear of the Division, so that all division elements had to reach the north bank of the Somme, detouring west of Amiens.

The march route between the Seine and the Somme, extending about 120 km, was covered by all division elements in 48 hours.

The advanced elements north of the Somme were already again engaged in combat on 1 Sep, while the bulk of the Div was still located south of the Somme (Appendix 7).

The lull which had been expected north of the Somme did not occur. The Division received the mission to defend with its right wing the Somme sector at the railroad bridge south-west of Flixecourt up to Amiens. Because of enemy forces established north-west of Amiens, the left wing had to be bent backwards.

1 September

The advanced combat units arriving during the night of 1/2 Sep were committed on the left wing. But, already in the forenoon, the security units committed there, were encircled in the north and some were annihilated. The artillery employed in the rear of the wing had to change over to firing on tanks at close range. The line ordered by the Corps could no longer be held. It was only due to the hesitating enemy advance that the artillery was able to change position and that the remaining elements of the Division, still located south of the Somme, could cross the river and be brought forward to the new line of resistance of Flixecourt--Canaples. There the left wing of the Division made contact with the 346 Inf Div. In the course of the day, by order of Corps, 331 Inf Div was moved around the rear of the 346 Inf Div and was committed on the left of this Division for the extension and security of the Corps' left flank toward Doullens.

On the evening of 1 Sep, the Division received the mission to take over the security of the Corps' deep flank north and north-west of St Pol (Appendix 8).

In spite of the fact that the troops were overly tired, the distance of 30 km and more was still covered during the night of 2 Sep. The situation at and west of St Pol was entirely uncertain. According to a rumor, enemy tanks were supposed to be in Hesdin. I therefore gave orders to bring up the front troops from the rear into the line of Humieres--Anvin--Heuchin and in case of necessity, to capture and hold these localities.

During the morning of 2 Sep, one company unexpectedly encountered enemy tanks at Humieres. The crew of the enemy tanks was also surprised. The officer in charge of the company took in the situation at once and immediately attacked the tanks and captured the crews. Three tanks, one armored scout car and some motor vehicles were captured. I mention this episode to emphasize the unbroken fighting spirit still prevalent among the troops after marches and battles lasting for days.

The Kampfgruppe, which was to occupy Anvin, encountered enemy reconnaissance troops there, dispersed them and held the locality against further enemy attacks which occurred during the day. Contact with the 64 Inf Div was established.

On the evening of 2 Sep, the Division already received a new mission which required an approach march covering about 90 km.

Mission: The area south-east of Ypres is to be speedily reached via Aire--Hazebrueck. Enemy crossing of the canal in the line of Warneton--Wervicy--Menin is to be prevented (Appendix 9).

The advanced division elements arrived in the assigned area during the night of 3/4 Sep. The rest of the Div reached the assigned sectors by the evening of 4 Sep.

The canal bridges were not yet in the hands of the enemy.

In the course of 5 Sep, enemy reconnaissance was repelled before the front line.

The following radio message arrived on 5 Sep:

The 331 Inf Div will immediately march to Dunkerque and

permit itself to be encircled. The sector will be taken over by the 59 Inf Div in the course of the day.

The orders for relief and march had not been issued yet when the above-mentioned order was rescinded. As I learned later, the Commander of Dunkerque was said to have protested against bringing up further divisions.

Operations of the 331 Inf Div were terminated. In spite of having only entered the fighting after the tactical situation at the Invasion front line had been decided in favor of the enemy, this Division fought at decisive front sectors. The excellent fighting qualities of the Division, emphasized at the beginning of this report, fully proved their worth during this one month of commitment. The Division prevented the encirclement of the remnants of Fifth Pz Army and Seventh Army south of the Seine--which success was to be attributed solely to this Division--and, during outstanding march performances and costly battles, the Division covered the retirement of Fifteenth Army on the left flank in northern France, north of the Seine.

The <u>combat strength</u> of the Division had shrunk to 1/3 or 1/4 of its authorized strength. A further use of this Division was only possible if new replacements could be brought up. According to the situation of Fifteenth Army, that was impossible. On orders of the Army, the remnants of this Division were assigned to other divisions.

The <u>division staff</u>, with remnants of the Signal Bn, received the <u>mission</u> to take over the command of the 70 Inf Div at the Schelde bridge-head near and north-east of Ghent.

IV. Concluding Observations.

No exact and detailed data can any longer be given about the fighting strength and the losses that were incurred.

The morale among all units was very high until the end. The Division had at its disposal an excellent officer corps.

Situation in the Air: The enemy fighter bomber activity hindered the daytime traffic on the roads during the entire period of commitment and caused severe losses, especially to supply. Enemy bomber units attacked often in an uninterrupted stream especially near the Seine crossing, without attaining the success they may have intended. Strong enemy bomber units were also committed at the Somme. But there too, German losses were relatively small.

The German Luftwaffe only rarely appeared in this front sector.

Methods of combat used by the enemy: The enemy armored formations usually attacked energetically, but were slow to exploit their attained successes.

I am of the opinion that, according to the situation at the open flank and in the rear of Fifteenth Army, it might have been possible to encircle and annihilate the remnants of Seventh Army, and Fifteenth Army, between the Seine and the Somme.

Signed: Steinmueller

V. Command of the 70 Inf Div by the Staff of the 331 Inf Div.

During the operations of Fifteenth Army, the 70 Inf Div, called the Walcheren Division, was committed in the Belgian area on both sides of Ghent in order to secure the Schelde crossings. The commander of the Division and his staff, however, were needed to prepare the defense of the island* and were ordered back there.

I, together with the Staff of the 331 Inf Div, received the mission to take over command of the 70 Inf Div, until this Div could be pulled out of the front line and brought to Walcheren.

After an orientation in the sector, I took over the Division on 10 Sep (it might have already been on 8 or on 9 Sep (Appendix 10).

The following elements were committed in the sector of the Division :

On the right: With the right wing at Ghent:
The 101st Gren Rgt;

On the left: The 1020 Gren Rgt with a Kampfgruppe from Ghent and fragmentary units from Antwerp.

The regiments of the 70 Inf Div were composed of soldiers suffering from stomach troubles and, therefore, had poor fighting qualities. It was intended to pull the Division out of the front line and to recommit it against Walchern. The preparations for this began immediately after I took over command. First, all dispensable elements were evacuated via Breskens and Terneuzen.

* (Ed: The island of Walcheran at the mouth of the Schelde River, for which the 70 Inf Div was named).

Enemy attempts to cross the canal at the north-west edge of Ghent, failed at first.

On the 12 or 13 Sep, however, the enemy succeeded in crossing the canal near Ghent and establishing himself on the northern bank of the river.

The security detachments near Lockeren and east of it had to be withdrawn in the face of a superior enemy.

On 15 Sep the relief of the combat troops and the crossing to Walcheren began. I no longer recall which troops took over the sector of the 70 Inf Div.

The task of ferrying across the Division, which again and again was held up while other units were sent across, was finally completed on 22 Sep and, with that, my mission was accomplished.

Signed: Steinmueller

Translation only

edited by Anne Hall

Appendix 1

The 331 Inf-Division.
author: Gen.Lt. Steinmueller

July 1944

Calais

light Art-Bn

Field replacement
training Bn

Medium
Art-Bn

Supply troops

Boulogne

Appendix 2

The 331 Inf.Division

author:Gen Lt Steinmueller

Supply troops

Rouen

Tactical situation on
5 August 1944

Ordered assembly
area of division

medium
Art-Bn

Elbeuf

559 Gren-Rgt
crossing over
and Pi-Bn

Evreux

light
Art-Bn

Bernay
Antitank- and
Antiaircraft-Co

559 Gren-Rgt
one Bn of 557 Gren-Rgt
Assault gun Co
advancing towards the 7 Army

Remains of 557 Gren-Rgt

ANNEX
~~Appendix~~ 13

from 21 Aug on

Conches

Eyre

front line
from 18 Aug on

Faigle

Pz-Bn Wahl until 14 Aug
Verneuil

Dreux

The 331 Inf-Division

author Gen Lt Steinmueller

Chartres

Appendix 4

The 331 Inf-Division

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

21 to 26 August 1944

Elbeuf

344 Rgt-group Neubourg

Bernay

as of 21 August

Field replacement training-Bn 331

Breteuil

Laigle

ANNEX
~~Appendix~~ 5

The 331 Inf- Division

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

26 to 30 August 1944



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~~Appendix~~ 6

The 331 Inf-Division

Author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

29 to 31 August 1944

Neufchatel

Poix

to Amiens

Forges
les Eaux

Rouen

Gourney

30 August last elements

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ANNEX
~~Appendix~~ 7

The 331 Inf- Division

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

night of 1/2 sept

Abbeville

Doullens

MLR ~~d~~dered for
the 1 Sept by the
Army

1 to 2 September 1944

Belloy
1 September
under construction

Amiens
evening of 31 August

ANNEX
~~Appendix~~ 8

The 331 Inf-Division

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

St. Omer

2 September 1944

Aire

Bethune

Hesdin

331 Inf-Div
night of 1/2 Sept

Auxi le Chateau

Arras

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Annex ~~Appendix~~ 19

The 331 Inf-Division

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

4 September 1944

oulers

Ypres

331 Inf-Div, 2/4 Sept

Nacebruck

Aire

Lille

The 70 Inf-Division

under command of the 331 Inf-Div-Staff

author: Gen Lt Steinmueller

1o (8 ?) to 22 September 1944

VLISSINGEN
Flushing

Bresken

bulk of the 70 Inf-Div 15 to 22 Sept

Terneuzen

ferry point

Doel

elements of the 70 Inf-Div

Bruges

flooded

Ghent

END OF FILE

Anlage 1

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter Gen. Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Falkestone-Boulongne)
Sheet Nr. 1

Juli 1944

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

Steinmüller

Anlage 2

N.

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter Gen. Lt Steinmüller

1:250000 (Rouen-Paris) Sheet Nr. 7

Lage am 5. August 1944

Versorgungstruppen

Rouen
LXXXI.

Gournay

Befohlener Versammlungsraum der Div.

331.
Vandimare
29.7. - 2.8.

schwere Art.-Abteilung

Feld-Ersatz Btl.

Seine

Elbeuf

Gr. Rgt. 559
beim Übersetzen
dazu Pion. Btl.

Louviers

Andelys

Füsilier-Batl.

leichte Art. Abteilung

331.
3. - 4. 8

Bernay

Panzer-Jäger und Fla-Komp

leichte Art.-Abteilg.

Thevrai

331.
5. 6. 8.

Rest Gr. Rgt. 557

Evreux

leichte Art. Abteilung

Gr. Rgt. 558
1 Bu. G.R. 557
Sturmgesch.-Kp.
zur 7. Armee.
voraus.

Breteuil

Steinmüller

Anlage 3



331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter Gen. Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Rouen - Paris) Sheet Nr. 7

5.-21.8.1944

Steinmüller

Anlage 4

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter Gen.Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Rouen-Paris) Sheet Nr. 7

21.-26. August 1944



331. Inf. Division

Anlage 5

Bearbeiter: Gen. Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Rouen-Paris) Sheet Nr. 7

26.-30. August 1944



Anlage 6

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter: Gen.Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Havre-Amiens) Sheet 4

29.-31. August 1944



Steinmüller



331. Inf. Division
Bearbeiter: Gen. Lt. Steinmüller
1:250000 (Havre-Amiens) Sheet 4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 km
N
Anlage 7
1.-2. September 1944
Frévent
Auxi-le-Chateau
LXXXVI
Bernatre
331.
le Meillard
Riquier
Abbevillers
346.
Bernaville
Doullens
Lanches
Ailly
LXXXVI.
Domart
Beauquesne
Somme
Canaples
Flixecourt
Airaines
Belloy
Picquigny
Molliens-Vidame
AMIENS
31.8. abends
Poix
Camy
Grandvilliers
31.8
Steinmüller

Anlage 8

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter: Gen. Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Lille-Ghent) Sheet 2

0 5 10 15 20 25 30km

N

2. September 1944

St. Omer
Aire
331. J.D.
64.
Lillers
59.
2.9.
Bethune
2.9.
2.9.
Heuchin
331.
2.9.
331.
2.9.
Anvin
Humieres
Hesdin
St. Pol
1.9.
Arras
Auxi-le Chateau
331.
1.9. abends
Doullens

Steinmüller

Anlage 9

331. Inf. Division

Bearbeiter: Gen.Lt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Lille - Ghent) Sheet 2

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Km

N

4. September 1944

von Dunkerque

Poperinghe

Ypres

Roulers

Courtrai

331.
9.-59.

Menin

Werwicq

Warneton

Hacebruck

331. I.D. 2./4. Regiment

59. I.D.

Armentiere

Tourcoing

Roubaix

Aire

Lille

Steinmüller

Anlage 10

70. Inf. Division

geführt vom Stab 331. J.D.

Bearbeiter: Gen. Leutnt. Steinmüller

1:250000 (Lille - Ghent) Sheet Nr. 2

10.(8.) – 22. September 1944