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Wolf TRIERENBERG
Generalleutnant
CO, 347 Inf Div

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Report on the Commitment of the 347 Infantry Division

from 15 November 1944 until 24 March 1945

Translator: G. WEBER
Reviewer: Lt Col R.R. VERNON

HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND

MS # C-010

The Author

Wolf TRIERENBERG
Generalleutnant
Basic Arm: Infantry
Born: 18 June 1891
Forst/Niederlausitz, Eastern Germany

TRIERENBERG saw active service during World War I as a platoon leader and as a battalion commander and finally as a general staff officer with troops. He was granted General Staff Corps status in 1917 or 18.

He remained in the reduced German Army after the end of the War and from 1920 to 1937 served as company commander and as supply officer, intelligence officer and operations officer in various units and at various levels. In 1937 he was promoted to colonel and placed in command of an infantry training regiment at Doeberitz. In 1939 he was assigned to Wehrkreis VI* as chief of staff and a year later was transferred to the East Front as commander of the 12 Rifle Brigade and promoted Generalmajor. In August 1942 the general was promoted Generalleutnant and in 1943 was transferred to the West Front in command of the 347th Infantry Division which was his last assignment during World War II. He was captured by US forces at Plauen, Saxony.

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* The basic military area of Germany, somewhat similar to the pre-war US Corps Area.

EUCOM Historical Division
Office of the Chief Historian
APO 757, US Army

Enclosed I beg to send you the report ordered through Mr. Brandenberger. I regret that its completion had been somewhat delayed on account of sickness.

Signed: Wolf Trierenberg
Generalleutnant a.D.

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1 Appendix
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Report on the Commitment of the 347 Infantry Division

from 15 November 1944 until 24 March 1945

I. Background.

A. Beginning on 15 November 1944, the division was relieved in its sector in the Eifel by the 277 Volksgrenadier Division and immediately transported by railroad to Lorraine to join the First Army.

Organization of the division -- see appendix 1.

Position of the division -- see sketch 1 in appendix 2.

Higher headquarters:

a. XIII SS Corps, commanding general: *SS Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen SS Simon,

b. First Army, Commander in chief: General of Armored Forces v. Knobelsdorff.

Right flank: 19 Volksgrenadier division. Division commander: Generalmajor Britzelmayr,

Left flank: 36 infantry division, division commander: Generalmajor Helm.

B. Command Posts: First Army: St.Ingbert

XIII SS corps: Scheidt

347 inf. div.: Bisten

Inf.reg. 861: Peterchen

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* Equivalent to Lt General.

Inf. reg. 860: Varsberg

Art. reg. 347: Hargarten aux Mines.

C. Mission of the division was to relieve the 17th SS Armored Division (Division command post at Berveiller) in its sector on both sides of the Boulay-Moselle, and to hold the position at all costs.

D. Strength and Striking Power of the Assigned Troops.

The strength of the units of the division was about 80 percent of the authorized strength in consequence of the reorganization and replacements effected in the position at the Eifel (see report of 24 April 1947 - MS # B-563).

The composition of the units had slightly improved, compared with their commitment in the Eifel, insofar as the disabled soldiers had been eliminated. The replacements, however, consisted almost entirely of older age classes, originating partly from replacement units and partly from regional defense units.

Their training progressed only a little during the preceding two months due to urgent construction work in the West Wall, so that it was insufficient for mobile warfare.

The supply of heavy weapons had reached about 75 percent of the regular TO/E strength in the infantry, and 100 percent in the artillery by additional issue. But the division was not in possession of any antitank defense weapons with the exception of the antitank platoons of the infantry regiments. The assignment of an assault gun battalion, originally

planned, did not take place. Instead, one light antiaircraft defense company with twelve two centimeter antiaircraft machine guns were integrated into the division a short time before its departure.

The combat efficiency of the division was, therefore, but low. The old age and poor physical condition of the soldiers, as well as their lack of training, could not be off-set by their splendid fighting spirit, especially when facing an enemy equipped with modern and superior materiel.

II. Combat Activity.

15 November. After the personnel of the division advance party sent in advance to the First Army, had left by motor vehicles on 11 November under the command of the Ia, the movement of the division started on 15 November with one battalion of the 361st infantry regiment.

17 November. At 0900 hours, the command of the former sector of the division was transferred to the commander of the 277 Volksgrenadier Division.

At 1100 hours, the division commander departed by motor car with the operational group of the division staff to the First Army at St. Avold, arriving there at about 1300 hours. The high command of the First Army was, however, not present any more, as it had removed its command post in the meantime to St. Ingbert. The division commander reported there at 1900 hours at the Commander in Chief of the First Army, General v. Knobelsdorff, who gave him the following orientation: "In and around Metz, American forces have surrounded the German forces, only a small part of which could escape encirclement. So far the enemy has not pushed

on to the East, but it may be expected shortly. The mission of the 347 Infantry Division is to relieve the 17 SS Armored Division, committed on both sides of Boulay - Moselle and to hold this position at all costs, in order to prevent a further advance of the enemy to the East. The relief action has started already with the battalion of the 86lst Infantry which arrived today, and must be continued in the same manner as further units of the division arrive.

The division will be assigned to the XIII SS corps, General Simon commanding. The division command post has been already installed at Bisten by the Ia, Operations Officer, of the division."

Thereupon the division commander proceeded with the operational group to the division command post at Bisten, where he arrived at 2300 hours. The general staff officer reported that parts of the SS forces had already been relieved by the 1st Battalion, 86lst Infantry, which had been committed on the right wing of the sector. Further units of the 86lst Infantry were due to arrive and would be detrucked during the night, according to a message by the transportation officer of the First Army.

18 November. The 2d Battalion, 86lst Infantry arrived and was committed on the left of the 1st Battalion. Upon the commitment of this battalion, the commander of the 86lst Regiment, who had arrived at the same time, took over command in his regimental sector, with his command post at Teterchen.

Also, the first units of the 347th Artillery arrived and were committed in the sector of the 86lst Infantry. The position of the division was not

a defense line constructed with the modern technique of fortifications, but consisted of a system of trenches only, most of them still in course of construction, and anchored on the old fortifications of the Maginot line. These works were suitable for billeting troops but not for defensive purposes, because they faced in the wrong direction and were neither armored nor otherwise put in a proper condition for defense. The fire and communication trenches were mostly only knee deep, thus, the fact that the position was anchored. Wire entanglements and mine fields did not exist. On the Maginot line meant no economy of manpower for the division, for, right from the beginning, all available forces were kept busy improving the position and putting it, to some extent, into a proper state for defense. This meant continual physical work for all officers and ranks. The continual rainy weather and heavy clayeoil, everywhere present, rendered the work more difficult.

There was no contact yet with the enemy, nor did the combat reconnaissance sent out meet an enemy in the outpost area. But on the Bettange - Beckange road, stragglers and parts of the trains of the forces surrounded at Metz retreated.

19 November. At 0900 hours, the commanding general of the XIII.SS Corps, General Simon, arrived at the division command post and ordered the 347 Infantry Division not to wait for the arrival of the 860 Infantry, but to take over the command of the sector at 1200 hours, because the staff of the 17th SS Armored Division would be immediately withdrawn by

order of the Army. The regiment of the 17th Armored Division, still committed in the southern part of the division sector, was attached to the 347th Infantry Division until relieved by the 860th Infantry.

After the commanding general had left the division command post, the division commander proceeded by motor car to the command post of the 17 SS Armored division at Berveiller, in order to take over the command in the sector hitherto held by that Division.

20 November. The enemy attacked the adjacent division on the right (19 Volksgrenadier Division) with strong forces north of Foret de Bouzonville, driving it back to the East and making it necessary to withdraw the left flank of the 19 Volksgrenadier Division from Bouzonville to Niedaltdorf.

In consequence of this withdrawal, the 347 Infantry Division received orders from the corps headquarters to extend its right flank to include Bouzonville, which was carried out by the 861st Infantry during the afternoon.

Some enemy armored reconnaissance cars advanced into Boulay-Moselle and drove back the outposts of the regiment of the 17th SS Armored division stationed there.

The first units of the 860th Infantry arrived and started relieving the regiment of the 17 SS Armored Division still in position in the division sector.

21 November. Relief of the SS regiment was continued by the arrival of additional units of the 860th Infantry, which now took over command in its regimental sector - Denting (inclusive) - Zimming (exclusive).

The regiment was relieved from attachment to the 347th Infantry Division and returned to the 17th SS Armored Division.

In the course of the day, enemy tanks advanced from the north on Bousonville and tried to cross the La Nied River. Receiving fire from the antitank guns stationed at Bousonville, they withdrew, however, into the forest of Le Stockholtz.

The rest of the front was quiet.

22 November. Because of continued strong enemy pressure upon the 19 Volksgrenadier Division, the 559th Volksgrenadier Division was committed between the 347th Infantry Division and 19th Volksgrenadier Division. The line separating the 347th Infantry Division and 559th Volksgrenadier Division remained as previous to 20 November.

Weak reconnaissance thrusts of enemy armored scout cars north and northeast of Boulay - Moselle were repelled.

23 November. Enemy armored forces advanced on Boulay-Moselle along the road Les Etangs - Boulay - Moselle and occupied the position already evacuated by our own combat outposts.

A two centimeter machine gun battalion, with twenty-four two centimeter antiaircraft machine guns, was attached to the division, but, having no means of transportation, it remained immobile. It was employed for the protection of the artillery stationed southeast of Coume. But as no

equipment for antiaircraft was available, the battalion could only be used in ground combat. Besides, the battalion brought along a very small quantity of ammunition, which could not be replenished by the division either, so that this unit did not bring about any considerable increase of fire power of the division.

24 November. During the forenoon, the enemy developed increased combat activity. The positions of the combat outposts on the south-western edge of the forest Bois d'Ottonville and on both sides of Rierange and Denting were shelled by artillery. The following attacks on these positions, repeated in the afternoon, were repulsed. But it was to be expected that the enemy would resume his attacks the next day with increased strength to force a break-through on both sides of the road Teterchen - Boulay-Moselle.

Appropriate orders were given by the division to the regiments. The artillery regiment was ordered to make preparations for fire concentrations, especially southwest of Rierange. In spite of it, the division looked forward to the next day with some apprehension as the artillery had little ammunition and no further supplies were to be expected.

25 November. As expected, the enemy repeated his attacks on the morning of the 25th of November northeast of Boulay-Moselle. In spite of the strong numerical superiority of the enemy and the commitment of airplanes and tanks, the attacks were not successful and were repulsed. Enemy units, which had temporarily entered Denting, were driven out again by a counter shock by local reserves, leaving twenty-two prisoners in the hands of the 860th Infantry.

26 November. After a calm night, the enemy again attacked early on the morning of the 26th with increased forces against the front north-northeast of Boulay-Moselle, as well as against the left flank of the division north of Zimming.

Northeast of Boulay-Moselle, the enemy succeeded, after fluctuating battles and after the artillery had used up its ammunition, to penetrate in the afternoon into Rierange and Denting. Enemy tanks pushed on further to Teterchen and forced the regimental staff of the 860th Infantry to withdraw from there.

Another main effort of the enemy attack was directed against the 3d Battalion of the 861st Infantry which was attacked by an enemy armored regiment, on the left of the division sector. After the two companies committed in the first line had been rolled up by enemy tanks, the reserve companies of the battalion together with the 9th Company of the battalion of the 860th Infantry on its right offered heroic resistance, under the command of the battalion commander in order to prevent a further advance of the enemy tanks. These brave soldiers succeeded in holding up the advance of the enemy tank regiment for ten hours, and only after the majority of the men had been killed or wounded and the ammunition was exhausted did they surrender.

The enemy attacking Niedervisse succeeded in occupying this place and advanced through the Bois de Coume to the edge of the forest south of hill 366, where the attack was stopped, for the time being, by the fire of the

machine gun battalion committed on Hill 366. After what little available ammunition had been expended, the machine guns had to be blown up because they could not be brought back for want of means of transportation.

As it was not possible to recapture the position, due to the enemy penetrations and the heavy losses suffered by the infantry - about three battalions - corps headquarters ordered the division to break contact with the enemy during the night of 26 and 27 November and establish a new line of defense on the line Brett - Teterchen - Coume - Niedervisse - Boucheporn - Longeville. Owing to the heavy losses and the proximity of the enemy, it was, however, possible to occupy only a thin line of defense, on the line Brettnach - highground east of Teterchen - highground 1 1/2 km south of Hargarten aux Mines - Guerting - Varsberg - highground northeast of Boucheporn. See sketch 1 in appendix 2. But as the enemy did not immediately fully exploit his successes, this movement was carried out without interference by the enemy until the morning of 27 November.

27 November. The enemy remained inactive on this day. As there was but little chance for the division to hold the new line of resistance with its weak remaining forces in the face of renewed enemy attacks, the division asked the permission of the corps headquarters to withdraw in the southern section during the next night to the railroad embankment Falck - Carling, which offered some protection against enemy tanks. Towards evening, the division received orders to withdraw during the following night to the line Berveiller (exclusive) - Merten - Falck - Carling (exclusive).

28 November. The withdrawal was carried out without being noticed by the enemy so that the division stood at daybreak in the new line ready for defense.

In the course of the forenoon, the enemy attacked the position at Falck with strong forces from the direction of Hargarten-aux-Mines, but the attack was at first repulsed. After repeated attacks, however, supported by artillery, the enemy succeeded towards midday on penetrating into the position on the height east of Falck. An immediate counter-attack by the 347th Fussilier Batallion threw the enemy back, bringing the position again into our hands. By a new surprise attack in the evening, however, the enemy succeeded in getting a hold on the western edge of the height, from which he could not be driven due to the heavy losses of the 347th Fussilier Battalion. Although the eastern part of the dominating height was held, the enemy had gained the advantage of being able to advance on the road Falck - Merten.

29 November. On the forenoon of 29 November, the enemy advanced with strong tank and artillery support against Merten, where heavy fighting developed. The garrison of Merten, splendidly supported by the artillery of the division, offered bitter resistance. Two enemy tanks, which had succeeded in entering the village Merten, were put out of action by units of the 861st Infantry in close combat. Besides, five enemy tanks were disabled by antitank guns of the antitank company of the 861st Infantry. At first, the attacks of the enemy infantry also were repulsed. But soon

the strong superiority of the enemy infantry and artillery made itself felt, so that our own over-taxed troops could not prevent the enemy from gaining a hold in the southern part of Merten and Bibling in the afternoon. Enemy tanks trying to advance south from Bibling against the positions of the 860th Infantry holding the flank at the Foret Domale de la Houve, did not succeed, because the whole terrain south of Bibling had become swampy due to the continuous wet weather.

Although, through the heavy losses suffered, the fighting power of the regiments was getting less and less, they had succeeded again in preventing a break-through of the enemy on this day. This was due to the heroic resistance of the soldiers and the excellent support of the artillery in spite of the lack of ammunition.

In the evening, corps headquarters ordered the division (See sketch 1, appendix 2.) to withdraw during the night to the line Berus - Ueberherrn - Carling (not included).

30 November. As the enemy remained inactive, the ordered withdrawal was executed according to plan, so that the division was in position in the new defense line on the morning of 30 November.

At the beginning, the enemy did not follow up. Also, in the course of the day, he engaged in only slight combat activity by shelling Bisten and Ueberherrn and carrying out weak reconnaissance, especially in the direction of Berus, Bisten and Ueberherrn, in the defense of which, a few prisoners were taken and two tanks disabled. The division command post was moved from Bisten to Buss.

1 December. In the course of the forenoon, the enemy continued his attacks especially against the northern sector of the division. Whereas the attacks against Bisten and Ueberherrn were repulsed, the 2d Battalion of the 86lst Infantry, committed at Berus, had to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy, in spite of tenacious resistance, and to give up possession of the dominating height at Berus. A counter thrust from the direction of Bisten to recapture the high ground had no success.

In the southern sector, the enemy only felt his way through the Foret Domale de la Houve by reconnaissance patrols, which were driven off.

In the sector of the division on the right, Altforweiler was lost, losing contact with that division. Late in the afternoon, the division received orders from the corps headquarters to withdraw its right flank, during the following night, to the northwestern edge of the forest Karlsbrunn - Group of houses 1 1/2 kilometers (See sketch 1, appendix 2.) east of Bisten - western edge of the forest, southeast of Ueberherrn. This movement was carried out according to plan and without interference from the enemy.

The enemy followed hesitatingly only, occupying Bisten and Ueberherrn in the course of the day. He directed his attacks especially against the front of the right division on the right and pushed on in the direction of Saarlautern.

Buss was shelled by enemy artillery and attacked by enemy airplanes. The division command post withdrew from Buss to Fuettlingen.

4 December. Whereas on 3 December the enemy showed no special combat activity against the sector of the division, on 4 December, the outposts of the division on the left in position at Hill 260 were driven back by a surprise attack of an enemy ranger battalion. The enemy pierced the main line of defense east of Hill 260, about 2 kilometers northwest of Carling, and advanced through the southern part of the forest, Der Karlsbrunn, north of Lauterbach Bau, to the eastern edge of the forest, fired at a battery of the division on the left southeast of Ludweiler and retired again. The battalion staff of the left flank battalion of the 360th Infantry was scattered by this assault.

In the following night, the disengagement was continued. The division received orders to withdraw to the line: northwestern edge of the eastern part of the forest Karlsbrunn - Hill 266 - Differten - Ludweiler - Grande Roselle. See sketch 2, appendix 2.

5 December. This movement had been carried out according to plan until dawn. During the night of 4 - 5 December the 21st Armored Division was assembled in the area Wadgassen - Schaffhausen - Rostenbach, with orders to attack early on 5 December in the direction of Neuforweiler - Sikard, in order to destroy the bridgehead formed by the enemy at Saarlautern on 3 December.

The 347th Infantry Division received orders to support this attack with the bulk of its artillery and special ammunition was supplied to the division for this purpose.

The 21st Armored Division started the attack at 0800 hours from Wadgassen through the eastern part of the forest Karlsbrunn in a northwesterly direction. Although well supported by the artillery of the 347th Infantry Division, the attack bogged down because of heavy artillery fire from the high ground west of Felsberg on the northwestern edge of the forest of Karlsbrunn. The attack was discontinued and the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn in the evening for other purposes.

The 87th Infantry of the 36th Division (Division on the left) was attached to the division at Schaffhausen for an intended attack on the western bank of the Saar against the flank of the enemy's position at Saarlautern. The attack, however, was not carried out and the regiment remained, for the time being, in Division Reserve at Schaffhausen. A commitment of this regiment by the division could only take place with the consent of the corps headquarters.

6 December. The day passed quietly on division front. In the evening, corps headquarters ordered the division to withdraw the main line of resistance on the right flank, during the next night, for reasons of economy of manpower, to the eastern bank of the Hollenbrahen Bau in the line Wadgassen - Berweln. See sketch 2, appendix 2.

7 - 8 December. This movement was carried out according to plan on the morning of 7 December. There was no other combat of the enemy worth mentioning against the front of the division.

The Fuesilier-battalion of the division was attached to the 719th Infantry Division for a counter-attack against the enemy bridgehead at Fraulautern - Ensdorf.

9 December. On 9 December, the enemy attacked the position at Werbeln and penetrated into the village, from which he could not be driven out. Corps headquarters ordered the main line of resistance in the sector Wadgassen - Ludweiler to be withdrawn during the following night to the line Buss (Saar) - Voelklingen - Wehrden - Hill 306 (southeast of Gieslautern) - Grande Roselle. See sketch 2, appendix 2.

The 87th Infantry was relieved from attachment and returned to its division.

10 December. The withdrawal was carried out by dawn according to plan and without disturbance by the enemy. Thereby the division had entered the West Wall with its right flank in the sector Buss (Saar) - Voelklingen, where the forward point of the West Wall extended along the eastern bank of the Saar. Furthermore, the responsibility for the sector of the West Wall from Voelklingen to the left boundary of the division (Saarbruecken excluded), was transferred to the division. This sector was occupied by three companies of the 12th Regional Defense Battalion and the 1st Volkssturm battalion, which were placed under the command of the division, was transferred to the division.

Furthermore, the 1033d Fortress Artillery Battalion, consisting of four batteries, was attached to the division.

The West Wall consisted of several defense lines with shelters of reinforced concrete, the front lines being adjacent to the eastern bank of the Saar. There were but few communication trenches between the individual shelters and the adjacent defense works. Moreover, these trenches, as well as numerous shelters, were flooded because of the high water level of the Saar and the subsoil water, and therefore were useless. The shelters were also not protected by wire entanglements or mine fields. Gasfilters were missing and the ventilator installations were out of order.

The West Wall had been divided, in its construction, into division sectors, each to be occupied by three regiments of three battalions each. The command posts from the battalion upwards were permanently established also as respects the system of communications. This proved to be a great disadvantage. The strength of the division, which consisted of two worn out regiments with weak forces instead of the three normal regiments, did not permit occupation of a sector as great as that provided for a division in the construction of the West Wall and the command posts did not coincide, either, due to the size of the units after the recent engagements. The result was difficulties in signal communication, which were not an immediate disadvantage owing to the hesitating advance of the enemy against the West Wall, but which could only be removed through laborious work of the signal battalion of the division.

The enemy followed in the course of the day from the direction of Werbeln only, occupying the Hill 284 east of Werbeln.

In the evening, corps headquarters ordered combat outposts in fighting strength to advance, during the following night, to the western bank of the Saar west of Voelklingen in order to form a small bridgehead. The 361st Infantry was ordered to carry out this mission.

11 December. Contrary to expectations, the bridgehead was established successfully as ordered, without interference by the enemy, who had not yet advanced to the east beyond Hill 284. As the division was not able to sufficiently strengthen the bridgehead forces, corps headquarters organized an emergency group from personnel of the corps headquarters staff and the corps signal battalion. This unit was moved into the bridgehead in the night of 11 December as a reinforcement and placed under the command of the division.

12 December. The enemy attacked the combat outposts stationed on the western edge of Wehrden, forcing them back into the village, and established himself in the western part of Wehrden. Also he occupied Hostenbach and Schaffhausen.

The division received orders to carry out a mission on 17 December to widen the bridgehead west of Voelklingen. For this purpose, the reserve officer applicant battalion of Wehrkreis Headquarters XII was sent to Voelklingen and assigned to the division. The infantry regiment was ordered to prepare and carry through this mission.

13 - 16 December. The enemy did not engage in any particular combat activity with the exception of some mortar firing on the crew of the

bridgehead west of Voelklingen and some weak harrassing artillery fire on Buss (Saar) and Voelklingen. The units of the division took advantage of this lull to improve the fortifications with all available forces. In particular, trenches for the outside defense of the shelters and wire entanglements were constructed so far as the material made available to the division permitted. The engineer battalion of the division laid mine fields in front of the main line of resistance of the West Wall. All these works proceeded slowly only owing to the scanty supply of barbed wire and mines.

The enemy continued his daily attacks against the division on the right and succeeded in widening his bridgehead at Fraulautern - Ensdorf, advancing to the southern edge of Ensdorf.

Corps headquarters intended to eliminate this bridgehead of the enemy and ordered the divisions to organize heavy mortar companies. For this purpose, the heavy mortar platoons of the infantry regiments were detached and assembled.

17 December. Early on 17 December, the 361st Infantry carried out the mission ordered by corps headquarters to widen the bridgehead west of Voelklingen. The attack progressed only slightly, due to the strong defense fire of the enemy, who was on the alert because of the beginning of the Ardennes offensive on the previous day. Therefore, the bridgehead could be widened only to an insignificant extent.

18 - 31 December. During this period, there was no particular combat activity. The combat lull was made use of by the division to furnish replacements to the infantry regiments, worn out through the continuous commitments and combats. For this purpose, all soldiers fit for service were drawn out of the trains and assigned to fighting units. Further security detachments were formed in the rear services of the division, and these served to relieve infantry companies in the front line for a certain time, offering the latter an opportunity for recreation and training.

Besides, the division had ordered that one group of each company of the front line should be withdrawn to the regimental command posts, alternately, for eight days of recreation and training. The division was alive to the fact that the front line would be weakened through this measure, but it was the only way to retain the fighting power of the soldiers intact.

23 December. On 23 December, the division on the right (559th Volksgrenadier Division) was relieved by the 719th Infantry Division. In the course of this relief movement, the right boundary of the 347th Infantry Division was shifted further to the north to the southern edge of Ensdorf. The 347th Fusilier Battalion, committed in the new sector, was at the same time attached to the division again. See sketch 2, appendix 2.

26 December. In consequence of the withdrawal of the division on the left (36th Infantry Division), the sector of the 347th Infantry Division was extended to the east to Kerbach, inclusive, by the width of 1 1/2 regimental sectors. New boundaries of the division: Saarbruecken - Alsting - Kerbach (towns included). An infantry regiment of the 36th Division with

two weak battalions (See sketch 2, appendix 2.) committed in this sector, and two Volkssturm battalions committed in the West Wall near Saarbruecken, as a security garrison, was attached to the division.

The division was assigned to the LXXXII. Infantry Corps, commanded by Generalleutnant Hahn, with corps command post at Nadern.

The commanding general, when visiting the division command post, ordered the division commander to advance west of Voelklingen, by an attack with a limited objective, during the night of 31 December 1944/1 January 1945 and to start preparations for it at once. The purpose of this attack was to recapture Hill 284 east of Herbeln, which allowed the enemy direct observation and fire on the Saar valley near Voelklingen and to the east, as well as on the Voelklingen iron works which were still in working order.

Preparations for the intended attack were started at once as well as the necessary regrouping of the infantry regiments and artillery. To strengthen the sector of the attack, the rest of the front was weakened to a large extent and the observation and security of these front sectors carried out by security detachments of the rear services of the division and the 12th Regional Defense Battalion.

The artillery was so regrouped that it could concentrate the fire of all batteries in front of the attack sector. Furthermore, two heavy infantry guns of the 719th Division and one heavy mortar company, as well as the corps artillery commander, were assigned to the division.

1 January 1945. At 0000 hours the attack started. It was carried out by:

a. The 86lst Infantry with the third battalion of the 86lst and 345th Fusilier Battalion advancing from the right of the bridgehead west of Voelklingen through Hostenbach - Schaffhausen to Hill 284, the capture of Hill 284, east of Werbeln, being assigned to the 347th Fusilier Battalion that had stood its test in all previous combats.

b. The 860th Infantry in its sector, with the second battalion of the 86lst Infantry, and the 2d Battalion of the 860th on Gieslautern - Ludweiler. The objective of the attack as ordered by the division was: Western edge Schaffhausen - road Werbeln - Ludweiler - railroad east of Ludweiler. The objective of the attack assigned by the division was beyond that ordered by corps headquarters, in order to permit a quick consolidation of the captured position on Hill 284 east of Werbeln under the protection of outposts established at Werbeln.

The battalions started punctually from their assembly points without any artillery preparation in a surprise attack on the enemy positions. The artillery were prepared to subdue any enemy resistance by concentrated fire.

The third battalion of the 86lst Infantry reached the western edge of Hostenbach and Schaffhausen quickly, the 347th Fusilier Battalion penetrated to the eastern edge of Werbeln after capturing Hill 284.

The 2d battalion of the 86lst Infantry captured Gieslautern, but could not contact the 347th Fusilier battalion, as its advance was slowed down in the forest west of Gieslautern.

The third battalion of the 860th Infantry overran the enemy outposts south of Hill 306 (southeast of Gieslautern), broke down initial enemy resistance at the pits south of Hill 306, and reached the railroad Gieslautern - Grande Rosselle without encountering strong resistance. Elements advanced to the height close to the east of Ludweiler.

At 0900 hours the battalions had reached their objectives assigned by the division, with the exception of the second battalion of the 86lst Infantry, which could not reach the road Werbeln-Ludweiler in its first assault, and which came to a halt at the eastern edge of the forest south of 284 because of increased enemy artillery fire.

The enemy was completely taken by surprise and offered practically no resistance. He retired speedily, leaving behind equipment and material, about thirty-three prisoners of the 100th Cavalry Group, and several motor vehicles.

About noon the enemy received reinforcements from the rear and, supported by tanks attacked elements of a company of the 347th Fusilier battalion, which had penetrated to the eastern edge of Werbeln. As the left flank of these units was unprotected, (having lost contact with the second battalion of the 86lst Infantry) the enemy succeeded in outflanking them from the south, capturing a large part of them.

Also elements of the third battalion of the 860th Infantry, that had advanced to the high ground of Ludweiler, were thrown back by enemy tanks. Enemy tanks, trying to advance from Werbeln in the direction of Schaffhausen, were compelled to withdraw owing to our accurate artillery fire.

As the objectives, as assigned by the corps headquarters, had been gained in spite of the reverses, the division abstained from trying to recapture the positions lost through enemy counterattacks, to avoid unnecessary losses.

2 January. During the night of 2 January, the captured positions were consolidated for defense with all available forces. Especially at Hostenbach, on the way to Wadgassen, at Schaffhausen on the way to Werbeln, and in front of the Hill 284, mines were layed by the 347th Engineer Battalion as a protection against enemy tanks. During the following days the enemy remained quiet.

On 5 January, in the course of the forenoon, enemy tanks advanced again from Werbeln in the direction of Schaffhausen. Two tanks succeeded in penetrating into Schaffhausen, but struck the newly laid mines and were immobilized.

6 - 31 January. During this period, the enemy did not repeat his counterattacks nor did he try to recapture the territory lost.

No particular combat activity took place in the division sector until the end of the month, with the exception of some harassing fire of the enemy artillery and mortars on the villages in the front line.

On 10 January, the 719th Infantry Division (adjacent on the right), supported by the bulk of the 347th Artillery with an ample supply of ammunition issued specially for the purpose, carried out a successful attack, with limited objectives, against the enemy bridgehead at Fraulautern-Ensdorf.

On 13 January, a heavy bombing attack on the town of Saarbruecken took place without any losses to the troops.

On 23 January, the division was withdrawn from the command chain of the LXXXII corps headquarters and was assigned, together with the 719th Infantry Division, to the newly established LXXXV corps headquarters: General d. Infantry Knioss, commanding.

In the meantime, the division continued its endeavors to build up its units and increase their fighting power.

Beside the above mentioned measures, the 347th Replacement Training Battalion was activated for this purpose from the enlisted personnel of a division personnel replacement battalion, which, billeted as security garrison in a rear position of the sector Bitweiler-Bersch weiler, trained newly assigned replacements for the units of the division and carried out training courses for non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, detailed from the units of the division, in order to raise the general standard of training.

Furthermore the 816th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion was assigned to the division, out of which the 347th Antitank Battalion was activated and incorporated into the division. The 7.5 cm antitank guns of the division and the division antiaircraft company were assigned to the battalion so that it consisted of one company 7.5 cm antitank guns, 1 company 3.7 cm anti-aircraft machine guns and 1 company 2 cm antiaircraft machine guns.

In addition, an assault gun company with 4, and later on with 10, guns operative, was assigned to the division at Gersweiler.

1 February. During the first days of February, the enemy became a little more active. Movements behind the enemy front and increased activity of reconnaissance patrols indicated intentions to attack.

3 February. On 3 February, the enemy attacked the positions at Osting with one battalion, and succeeded in penetrating the positions west of Osting. An immediate counterattack, supported by 4 assault guns, threw him back again, bringing the position back into our hands.

Weak enemy advances against the positions north of Marienau and on the road Forbach-Morsbach were repulsed.

As the division expected, the enemy attacks continued during the next few days, with the point of main effort east of Forbach and the regimental boundary between the 860th and 36th Infantry was shifted further to the East, so that the responsibility for the defense of Forbach was assigned to 860th Infantry.

4 February. On 4 February, the combat outposts at Behren-les-Forbach were attacked by superior enemy forces and withdrew to the main line of resistance according to orders.

5 February. On 5 February, the expected enemy attack against the Osting-Kerbach sector started. The enemy, advancing with strong support of artillery, tanks, and aircraft, succeeded in penetrating the positions east of Osting and on the high ground northwest of Kerbach, but was thrown

back again through immediate counterattacks, supported by assault guns.

6 February. The enemy repeated his attacks with increased forces and again penetrated into the positions east of Osting and on the high ground northwest of Kerbach. On the high ground northwest of Kerbach, a counter-attack at dusk, supported by 6 assault guns, recaptured the lost position once more.

As the attack by the assault guns in the direction of Osting, ordered by the division, did not succeed because of unfavorable terrain, the positions at Osting and the village had to be abandoned to the enemy. In the same evening, the enemy advanced to the east into le-Kleinwaeldchen. But as the 36th Infantry could not indisputably clear up the situation right away, the sealing off of the enemy, ordered by the division, through commitment of the regimental bicycle platoon and the bicycle platoon of the 860th Infantry on the southern edge of le-Kleinwaeldchen, was of no further value. However, the two bicycle platoons succeeded in establishing, to a certain extent, contact between the left flank of 860th Infantry, on the eastern edge of Forbach, and elements of the 36th Infantry, which had withdrawn to the line southern edge Etzling - southwestern edge Bois Ermerich and le Brandenbusch, during the night, via Hill 371 (northwest of Etzling). See sketch 2, appendix 2.

8 February. Whereas the enemy remained quiet on 7 February, he continued his attacks along the road Osting-Forbach and in the forest east of Forbach on 8 February. The attacks against Forbach were repulsed through

the support of the assault gun platoon attached to the 860th Infantry. In the forest east of Forbach, however, the enemy succeeded in forcing the thin security line of the two bicycle platoons back to the Spicheren position west of Hill 344 (northwest of Spicheren). Besides, the enemy advanced in the adjacent left sector through le Brandenbusch on Zinzing, where, however, the left battalion of the 36th Infantry succeeded in halting the penetration of the enemy on Hill 290 northeast of Zinzing. As no forces were available to carry out a counterattack, those units of the 36th Infantry still stationed at Etzling were withdrawn during the night 8 - 9 February (See sketch 2, appendix 2.) into the Spicheren position north of Spicheren. This position was comparatively well constructed with concrete shelters and defense structures, partially equipped with antitank guns of a fortress antitank battalion.

20 - 20 February. The enemy did not follow up this withdrawal immediately but during the next few days continued his attacks in the forest west of Hill 344, northwest of Spicheren. Here, in a situation which remained fluid for a while, the enemy, in close combat action and by the use of phosphorus, succeeded in capturing a few trenches of the Spicheren fortifications.

21 February. After strong artillery preparation and with long distance support of several tanks, the enemy started his expected attack against the Spicheren fortifications on 21 February. In spite of stubborn resistance which was at first successful, the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the

positions north of Spicheren and in occupying the dominating high ground one kilometer north of Spicheren, as well as Hill 341 northwest of Spicheren.

Immediate counterattacks of the weak local reserves of the 36th Infantry brought no success. Also the reconnaissance battalion of the 6 SS mountain division, attached to the division, which under a smoke screen of the division artillery, had started a counterattack from the direction of Saarbruecken, on the high ground one kilometer north of Spicheren, did not succeed in recapturing this important position. The battalion reached, however, the northern edge of the high ground and held on to it. But during the following night, the battalion was withdrawn and reverted to its division.

Joining the reconnaissance battalion to the East, the remainder of the 36th Infantry, that had been committed on Hill 341 (1 1/2 kilometers northeast of Spicheren) stuck to the north and northeastern edge of the hill and, in this way, kept contact with the units east of Hill 341, that had not been attacked. Forbach was evacuated by the 860th Infantry. Although it would have been easy for the enemy to penetrate into the West Wall and beyond it -- the Volkssturm stationed at the West Wall as a security garrison would have been no obstacle of importance -- he contented himself with the objectives reached and did not continue his attacks during the following days.

<u>24 February</u>. Although the sector of the 861st Infantry and the larger part of the front of the 860th Infantry had not been attacked by the enemy, the division had suffered heavy losses through the engagements of the

36th Infantry. As the division could not hold out any reserves, owing to the great breadth of its front and as the corps headquarters could not supply any reserves, units of the 861st and 860th regiments, that had not been attacked, were repeatedly withdrawn and assigned to the 36th Infantry to enable it to continue an orderly fight. The disadvantage of weakening the right flank of the division had to be put up with. The division, therefore, was not in a position to make counterattacks to recapture the heights of Spicheren.

For this reason, the army committed the 559th Volksgrenadier division at Saarbruecken to recapture the Spicheren fortifications. As soon as the first regiment of the 559 Volksgrenadier Division had arrived on 26 February, it received an order to attack on the following day, which was contrary to the recommendation of the 347th Infantry Division, to delay the counterattack until the whole 559 division arrived. The regiment assembled during the night 26 - 27 February, in the northern part of the forest south of St. Arnual, and jumped off on the morning of 27 February with the objective of retaking the position from the East. The attack in the wooded area, unsuitable for effective artillery support, was unsuccessful. The Spicheren fortifications remained in enemy hands.

28 February - 12 March. When the balance of the 559th Volksgrenadier Division had arrived, the units of the 36th Infantry, committed south of Saarbruecken, were relieved by it during the night of 2 March by order of the corps headquarters and the sector from the Saarbruecken - Forbach railroad

to the Saar taken over by the 559th Volksgrenadier Division. At the same time, the defense units south of Saarbruecken were withdrawn into the West Wall. The boundary between the 347th Infantry Division and the 559th Volksgrenadier Division was Gersweiler - Schoeneck - Forbach. Also during the period following, the enemy did not continue his attacks against the sector of the division, but restricted his activity to harassing the left flank by continuous reconnaissance probing and artillery fire.

13 - 19 March. During the night of 12 - 13 March, the 559th Volksgrenadier Division was withdrawn by order of the army and its sector taken over by the 347th Infantry Division. Boundary as before 2 March.

The division command post was moved to Fischbach. But as it was exposed there to continuous long range artillery fire of the enemy, it was moved in the afternoon of 19 March to Wahlschied. For the rest, the enemy was inactive in the sector of the division.

Meanwhile on 18 March, the enemy attacked the northern adjacent corps with strong forces, forcing a break-through to the East. Thereupon, the 719th Infantry Division, committed on the right of the 347th Infantry Division, was withdrawn to the line Dirmingen-Puettlingen, after its right flank had already been bent back into the Hilgenbach position during the night of 17 - 18 March. In connection with this movement, the 347th Infantry Division received orders from corps headquarters to withdraw its right flank during the same night to the line Puettlingen - Voelklingen. In consequence of the effects of the break-through of the enemy at the northern adjacent corps and

his advance to the area northwest of Kaiserslautern as of noon 19 March, corps headquarters ordered the division to withdraw, during the night of 19 - 20 March, to Homburg, and to secure the line Vogelbach - Homburg against the enemy anticipated from the north. On the right, the 719th Infantry Division was to cover both sides of Landstuhl. The command post was moved to Bildstock on 19 March.

20 March. In view of the distance involved and the advance of the enemy far into the northern flank, it was doubtful, right from the beginning, whether this order could be carried out -- especially the withdrawal of the 861st Infantry from the right front at Voelklingen. In fact, the bulk of the 861st Infantry and those elements of the 347th Artillery Regiment that had been committed in its sector, did not succeed in reaching their objectives, as they were cut off early on 20 March by the enemy, who advanced from the north via St. Ingbert. The immobile 1033d fortress artillery batallion was likewise taken prisoner by the enemy. On the other hand, the 860th Infantry, with the remainder of the 36th Infantry attached to it, succeeded in disengaging from the enemy and reaching the ordered line of resistance at 1000 hours 20 March. (sketch 4) During the whole night, rear areas, especially Neukirchen and Homburg, were under heavy enemy harassing fire.

The division command post was transferred to Knopp (about 12 kilometers east of Homburg) during the night of 19 - 20 March.

On 20 March, some enemy tanks felt their way forward from the North against the security detachments at Bruchmuehlbach, but were repulsed. A short time after dusk, a few enemy armored reconnaissance cars temporarily

entered Rosenkopf, but retired when fired on. During the whole day, enemy airplanes were very active, firing at each vehicle and even at single soldiers retiring on the roads.

Towards evening, the division received orders from the corps headquarters to continue the retreat to the East during the following night to the western edge of the Pfaelzer Wald, and to cover the entrance to this wooded area on both sides of Steinalben. The command post was to be shifted for the time being to Johanniskreuz (crossroads about 2 kilometers north of Schwa. bach).

21 March. To carry out this disengagement was very difficult, for the reason that all roads leading to the East from the sector of the division were used by all sorts of vehicles of the 17th SS Armored Division, that had been committed east of Saarbruecken and which had been ordered to retire to the East before the 347th Infantry Division. This caused continuous road jams and lead to the cutting off and capturing of large parts of the division, especially the vehicles of the different units, by the enemy advancing from the North and from the South.

As the division commander on his way to the new command post got word from the civilians that enemy tanks had already advanced to the South from Kaiserslautern and as he was fired on when approaching Johanneskreuz, he decided to continue the disengagement further to the East and to commit the 860th Infantry between Edenkoben and Landau to cover the roads leading out of the wooded area.

The command post of the division was established, for the time being, at Eschbach and shifted in the afternoon to Bornheim (about 4 kilometers northeast of Landau) when the covering parties of the 360th Infantry had reached the designated line. See sketch 5, appendix 2.

Communication with corps headquarters, interrupted since the evening of 20 March could be reestablished only in the afternoon.

There was no contact with units on the right and left.

Apart from some short assaults of enemy armored reconnaissance cars and a few bombs dropped on Eschbach, there was no contact with the enemy left in the afternoon. When the division had regained contact with the corps headquarters, it received orders to assemble the remnants of the division east of Landau.

At the same time, it was informed that the division was relieved from assignment to the LXXXV Corps and was assigned to the LXXX Corps.

When the division commander reported to the commanding general, General der Flieger Petersen, he was told by the latter that the 347th Infantry Division would be assigned to the XIII SS Corps instead of to LXXX Corps. Corps command post: Mill, 1 kilometer south of Zeiskau.

22 March. Early in the morning, the division commander received information from the commanding general that strong enemy forces had penetrated through the Pfaelzer mountains to the East and that probably parts of these forces would turn to the South. The division received orders to cover with its small forces the line Westheim Obr.Hochstadt (about 11 kilometers northeast of Landau). See sketch 6, appendix 2. Until about 1000 hours, the

designated outpost line had been occupied by the 860th Infantry. There was no contact with adjacent troops on the right or left. The division command post was moved to Zeiskam, where the division staff arrived at 0900 hours.

Enemy tanks, advancing from Freimersheim in the direction of Friesbach, had been observed by noon, and there followed, at about 1600 hours, an assault by tanks from Weingarten on Nieder Lustadt. They were shelled by antitank guns, that had been concentrated at Nieder Lustadt on account of the observations made at noon, and retreated to Weingarten. No further attack took place. Enemy fliers bombed Zeiskau. Towards evening, the command post was shifted to the mill, abt 3 kilometers south of Nieder Lustadt.

The night passed without particular combat activity. Early in the morning, the command post of the division was moved to the red mill about 4 kilometers southeast of Nieder Lustadt, the former command post of the corps.

In the afternoon, corps headquarters ordered the division to retreat at dusk to west of Germersheim to secure the crossing of the Rhine. This movement was carried out after nightfall without interference from the enemy.

In order to avoid annihilation of the covering parties in the open field west of Germersheim by enemy airplanes, the division ordered the outpost line to be: Line running from 2 kilometers north of Germersheim - group (See sketch 6, appendix 2) of houses to the West of it - eastern

edge of the forest west of Germersheim to the Germersheim - Bellheim road (exclusive).

The left flank was to be secured by the 17th SS Armored Division which was still in contact with the enemy southwest of Germersheim, and which was to withdraw to the road Bellheim - Germersheim.

No fortifications for the defense of Germersheim had been prepared. On the western edge of the town only, there existed a few concrete shelters with short communication trenches in which the command post of the corps had been established in the morning.

The command post of the division was established in the barracks near the church on the western edge of Germersheim. All available vehicles were evacuated across the Rhine.

24 March. The night had passed quietly. In the morning, four light Russian field guns were assigned to the division by corps headquarters and these were committed by the division for antitank defense. The most important defense line against enemy tanks was considered to be the road Germersheim - Bellheim. But as the commanding general gave the assurance that the 17th SS Armored Division would be taken back to this road with a sufficient number of antitank guns, and that it was not the responsibility of the 347th Infantry to secure this road, the four field guns were placed close to the northwest edge of Germersheim as protection against enemy tanks which might emerge from the forest west of Germersheim.

During the night, corps headquarters committed close to the northwest of Germersheim, a group of the Second Mountain Division, about 200 strong, which was later attached to the division.

In the course of the forenoon a few tanks felt their way forward in the forest west of Germersheim against the defense lines of the 360th Infantry, but were repulsed.

At 1100 hours, the command post of the corps was moved to Neudorf on the eastern bank of the Rhine. After the crossing of the staff of the corps, the bridge across the Rhine was blown up by order of the commanding general. When leaving the western shore of the Rhine, the commanding general transferred the command of the bridgehead at Germersheim to the division commander, to whom the commander of Germersheim was attached. Besides, the 17th SS Armored Division was to be attached to the 347th Infantry Division on its arrival at the bridgehead. At 1430 hours, enemy tanks attacked along the road Germersheim - Bellheim. At the same time the town was shelled by heavy enemy artillery.

The way to Germersheim was open for the enemy tanks, as the 17th SS Armored Division had not retreated, as ordered, from Bellheim to Germersheim, but in a westerly direction to Sondernheim. At this critical juncture, the division commander committed the staff of the division for the defense of the southwestern edge of the town, which succeeded in stopping the assault of the tanks still outside of the town.

As the enemy, for the time being, did not continue his attack, the command post of the division was shifted to the eastern edge of the town

at about 1700 hours. During the move a heavy shell struck the staff, putting out of action almost the entire tactical operations staff, including the Operational Intelligence officers, as well as almost all special missions staff officers. The commander of the division and one special missions staff officer only remained unwounded.

Telephone connection with the corps headquarters had been interrupted since noon, and corps headquarters did not answer radio calls either. The report of the division on the enemy attack did, therefore, not reach the corps headquarters.

Since the 360th Infantry, too, had been driven back to the western edge of Germersheim by evening and enemy tanks succeeded at nightfall in entering the town, the division commander decided to evacuate the bridgehead and to retreat to the eastern bank, in order to avoid annihilation of the troops on the next day by superior enemy forces.

At 2100 hours, the crossing on the assault boat ferry started, in the vicinity of the destroyed bridge, undisturbed by the enemy, whose artillery shelled the town Germersheim, but not the crossing point. At 2300 hours, the division commander was the last to leave the western bank of the Rhine and proceeded to the command post of the corps, where he received orders to proceed to the Seventh Army, with the staff of the division and the 347th Signal Battalion.

The 860th Infantry was assigned to the Second Mountain Division, committed for defense on the eastern bank of the Rhine.

signed: Wolf Trierenberg
Generalleutnant a.D.

1 appendix
6 sketches

Anlage 1

Gliederung 347.Inf.Div.

Stand: 15.11.1944.

347

861

860

347

III

II

I

15 15 10,5 10,5 10,5 10,5

3 3 3 3 3 3

347

347

12

Skizze 1
Maastab: 1 : 100 000
(amer.Karte)



Skizze 2
Massstab:
1 : 100 000



Skizze 3

Buss (Saar)

Voelklingen

Werbeln

Clarenthal

Grande
Roselle

Erlaeuterung:

Befohlenes Angriffsziel

erreichte Linie

Massstab:

1 : 100 000

Skizze 4

Massstab:
1 : 100 000

nach Landstuhl 6 km

Bruchmuehlbach
Vogelbach

Martinshoehe

Bruchhof Rosenkopf

Homburg Knopp

von Zweibruecken 7 km

Skizze 5

Massstab:
1 : 100 000

Edenkoben

Burrweiler

Roschbach

Frankweiler

Bornheim

Albersweiler

Landau

Skizze 6

Massstab:
1 : 100 000

Freimersheim

Weingarten

Hochstadt

Zeiskam 22.3.abds.

Germersheim

Bellheim

Sondernheim

ANLAGE 7.

C - 10

GLIEDERUNG 347. INF.DIV.

STAND: 15.11.1944.



23 JUL. 1948
BY : K.

SKIZZE 1

MASSTAB: 1:100 000

(AMER. KARTE.)

20 — 80 — 80 — 20

10 — 60 — 60 — 10

19.11.

27.11.

28.11.

30.11.

2.12.

La Nied Rau

Le Stockholtz

Bouzonville

Berweiler

Freisberg

Arforweiler

Berus

Bisten

Merten

Bibling

Oberherrn

Karlsbrunn

Rau

Forst

Hellengraben

Brotenach

Teterchen

Bois d'Ottonville

Coume

366

Bois de Coume

Boulay-Moselle

Niedervisse

Varsberg

Carling

Longeville

St. Avold

FORET DOMALE DE LA HOUVE

Den

Karlsbrunn

Bouchen

Zimming

Bettange

Etanges

Arlon

REGISTERED

23 JUN 1948

C - 10

GEZEICHNET:

Arthur Brinkmann

GEN. LT. A.D.

SKIZZE 2

MASSTAB:
1: 100 000

60 / 80 — 80 / 60

30 / 60 — 60 / 30

Eiweiler
HIEGENBACH-STELLUNG
15.3.
Wahl Schied
Birschweiler
19.3.
Bildstock
Fischbach
13.3.
Frauenlautern
SAAR LAUTERN
Ensdorf
Pikard
Felsberg
Neuforweiler
Altforweiler
19.3.
12.3.
Püttlingen
Buss (Saar)
861
Forst 266
Karlsbrunn
Wackgasse
Hostenbach
VÖLKLINGEN
Schoenhausen
Werbeln 284
Wehrden
Differten
SAAR
860
Clarenthal
Gersweiler
Giesslautern 306
Forst
Gudweiler
Der
Karlsbrunn
SCHOENECK
SAARBRÜCKEN
WESTWALL
2.3.
St Arnual
22.2.
Grande Rosselle
FORBACH
321
Spicheren
Etzling
Alsting
290
9.2.
Zinzing
Marienau
Le Kleinwasichen
Mörsbach
Oetingen
Kerbach
Le Brandenberg
7.2.
SAAR
26.12.
30.12.

GEZEICHNET:
[signature]
GEN. LT. a.D.

SKIZZE 3



ERLAEUTERUNG:

— BEFOHLENES ANGRIFFSZIEL

— ERREICHTE LINIE

MASSTAB:

1:100000

GEZEICHNET:

Abteilung Führungsstab

GEN. LT. A. D.

SKIZZE 4

C 010

MASSTAB:

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



GEZEICHNET:

Hilpert Primmersberger

GEN. LT.

REGISTERED
23 JUL 1948
DI : C - 10

C-010

SKIZZE 5

MASSTAB:

1:100 000



BY ... C - 10
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...STERED

GEZEICHNET:

[signature]

GEN. LT. a.D.

SKIZZE 6.

MASSTAB:

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





GEZEICHNET:

GEN. LT. A. D.