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Diary entries

Some written from memory

Commitment of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division during the German
Counterattack for the Elimination of the ANZIO - NETTUNE Beachhead in
February 1944.

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2. Landing of Allied forces and German countermeasures -- effect on the
"southern front."
3. The counterattack.
4. ~~Reasons~~ Causes for the failure.
5. ~~Consequences~~ Effects of the failure.

X Brief Survey of the Situation before the Landing -- Condition of the Division.

(Sketch 1)

With only brief interruptions, the bitter fighting for the "Gustav Line"
(the focal point being CASSINO) lasted throughout the entire winter. ~~During~~
~~part of this period~~ These engagements were carried out by the Allies in the
form of small-scale operations with the point of main effort varying in
accordance to increased commitment of numerically superior personnel and
materiel. ~~As a result of these operations~~ (Although) these operations led to partial successes for
the Allies, yet it was impossible to force a breakthrough through the "Gustav
line". The attack by the British in the lower GARIGLIANO area did lead to
a serious situation on 17 January 1944 as they succeeded in ~~building~~ (forming) a number

by the 44th Infantry Division and transferred to the area south of ROME for rehabilitation where at the same time it had to take over the protection of the coast south of the TIBER River as far as TERRACINA. The period required for the completion of relief extended beyond the middle of January.

On 18 January 1944 the Division was put into action again on the CARIGLIANO front owing to the situation described in the beginning. ^{(In addition to very weak coastal} ~~artillery~~ ^{artillery)}
~~(Battalion, 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 129th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, which had just at that time been granted relief from the CASSINO sector and which was completely exhausted, were charged with the protection of the coastal sector extending south of the mouth of the TIBER as far as TERRACINA. Immediately upon being granted relief from the CASSINO sector~~
^{(In addition to some very weak coastal artillery,} ~~and while in a state of complete exhaustion,~~ the 2d Battalion, 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 129th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion immediately upon being granted relief from the CASSINO sector ^(while) and in a state of complete exhaustion were charged with the protection of the coastal sector extending south of the mouth of the TIBER as far as TERRACINA -- ^{a distance of} far more than 100 km .

At the same time the main bulk of the Division was moved forward to ANSONIA and on 21 January 1944 began a counterattack against CASTELFORTE.

Thus it is evident that the ANZIO - NETTUNO coastal sector at this time ^(could be) ~~was~~ guarded by only weak elements, nevertheless it could not be defended by them. Higher Headquarters believed it necessary to take this danger into consideration particularly in view of the fact that our own air reconnaissance had produced nothing whatever indicating an immediately imminent Allied landing.

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In fact neither the embarkation in the harbor at NAPLES nor the approach of the invasion fleet had been ascertained. A very significant example of the weakness of our air forces!

Landing of the Allied Forces. (Sketch 1 and 2)

The landing of the Allies during the night 21 - 23 January 1944 on both sides of ANZIO - NETTUNO occurred not only completely by surprise, but it also ran into no kind of defensive activity. ^{(As a result,} ~~As a result,~~ landing operations and forming of a bridgehead could proceed, so to speak, in a calm and skillful manner. ~~Subsequently~~ ^{(until by 26 January it} The Allies ~~had~~ expanded the bridgehead ~~along the coast~~ extended approximately 4 km west of LITTORIA - 3 km south of CISTERNA - 5 km south of CAMPOLEONE - ^(Subsequently they fortified it.) ~~via GARDEN, subsequently fortified.~~ Surprisingly they failed to utilize this unexpected, favorable situation in any way. It would have been a very simple matter to have gained control of the dominating Albani Mountains (on the first day, approximately 36,400 men and 3067 vehicles were landed). In so doing they would immediately have severed the life line of the GARIGLIANO front -- which also happened to be the objective of the operation -- and would have been instrumental in bringing about the conditions leading to the collapse of the southern front and the fall of ROME in a short time. The Commanding General of the U.S. VI. Corps, however, did not order the attack to proceed from the beachhead until 30 January 1944. In accordance to "Operations in Sicily and Italy," Department of Military Art and Engineering US Military Academy - West Point New York 1945,

he had at his disposal 68,886 troops, 508 pieces and 237 tanks plus substantial supply reserves.

This extremely cautious procedure on the part of the enemy, gave the German Command time to pull out - without regard to mission - all available battalions, alarm units, headquarters, etc from the frontal sectors of the south front not in immediate danger, and commit them, as well as hastily organized elements, ~~in the gradual formation of~~ ^{to} a closed defensive front as it was ~~gradually formed~~ ^{around the enemy beachhead}. Thus it was possible to fortify the line of defense to a greater extent since the Allies even after ~~the passing of a few~~ ^{several more days had} ~~gone by~~ ^{gone by} ~~there~~ still had not launched an attack from the beachhead. The serious situation which the Allied invasion had brought about forced the Army Group to suspend the counterattacks which had started very promisingly for the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division on 21 January 1944. The Division, however, remained committed on the "southern front" until 12 February and was then shifted to the VELLETRI - ALBANO area where the main body had arrived on 14 February. ~~Without mentioning the fact that these preparations~~

The Counterattack. (Sketch 2 and 3)

The German Command had decided to eliminate the beachhead by a counterattack. The Division was slated for a vital mission.

The general preparations for the attack were as follows: regrouping and moving up of artillery and Panzer battalions, and storing of ammunition, etc., were intensified during the last few nights preceding the attack along the entire front. Without mentioning the fact that these preparations for

purposes of camouflage naturally had to be shifted to a time after dark, it would have been impossible to carry them out by day due to the one-sided air superiority of the Allies. ^{Even} Communications behind the German front were observed throughout the entire night from the air by the use of flash bomb flares, and harassed by ~~the~~ dropping of numerous bombs. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~behind the German front~~ Highways in far rear areas, likewise, were under harassing fire of enemy artillery, including naval artillery, at night.

Unfortunately the few days remaining before the beginning of the attack did not permit a rest period, which had been postponed during the fall and winter, for the units of the Division who had been in combat and were much battered. It was even impossible to throw in replacements which for the most part were young and poorly trained and who frequently showed up at the last minute.

The combat strength of the battalions may have amounted to approximately 300 men although exact substantiation is lacking.

The expected heavy artillery and tank support, the remote controlled demolition vehicles "Goliath" which was a new weapon for the unit, and in addition after many months of dogged defensive fighting and local counterattacks not mentioning the Allies usual artillery support amply supplied with ammunition and strong air force assistance, the possibility to be able to launch a promising attack lifted the morale of the unit considerably and instilled it with confidence of victory.

Preceding the main effort, several attacks were ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~

during 3 - 12 February) successfully executed for the purpose of eliminating the enemy salient south of CAMPOLENE and thereby ~~strengthening~~ ^{improving} the line of departure.

It was decided to launch the attack for the decisive blow on 16 February. The intention was to ~~place~~ ^{locate} the main effort of the attack along both sides of the ALBANO - ANZIO highway with the I Parachute Corps on the left flank and the LXXVI Panzer Corps on the right flank, break through at this point and thus drive a wedge into the beachhead and eliminate it.

At the same time the "Hermann Goering" Panzer Division, ~~supported by~~ ^{supported by} strong forces and heavy artillery fire, was ~~to launch the attack~~ ^[limited] to launch the attack with a partial objective along the CISTERNA - NETTUNO highway and ISOLA-BELLA as the immediate objective in order to deceive the the enemy in regard to the direction of the main attack.

~~The objective of this force was to break through the coastal defenses at NETTUNO~~

~~After the breakthrough~~

After execution of the breakthrough, the mission to push as far as the coast at NETTUNO was transferred to the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division. During the first day of the attack, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division remained in the ALBANO - VELLETRI area where it was currently located. During the night 16 - 17 February it was moved forward into the zone east of CAMPOLENE directly north of the CAMPOLENE - CISTERNA railway. The 26th Panzer Division was located in the adjoining area immediately to the west.

The attack began at 0630, 16 February and by afternoon on 17 February

the situation had developed as follows: In the face of stubborn enemy resistance and under heavy artillery fire and fighter bomber attacks, the attacking troops had reached the line in the approximate vicinity as shown in the inclosed sketches. The attack by the "Hermann Goering" Division was successful only to a minor extent, considering our own heavy losses.

The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was ^(now) attached to the LXXVI Panzer Corps and received orders late in the afternoon to move the units forward during the night and ~~at 0400, 18 February~~ and proceed with the attack at 0400, 18 February, by-passing the 715th Infantry Division.

It can hardly be assumed that the ~~impressed~~ Army Group was under the impression at this time that the enemy fortification system had been penetrated and ~~that~~ furthermore that the daring assault had been submitted to fresh reserves. ~~Impressed~~ At all events, both Army and Corps orders made it very clear that this objective had not been attained and was only to be obtained through commitment of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division. The force of the attack by the divisions which were committed to the main effort at this time, naturally weakened after two days of combat. However a deep penetration had been achieved which only needed to be widened to become a breakthrough. The 715th Infantry Division, as well as the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division adjoining on the right, was to ~~carry the attack forward during the night~~ and at 0400, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division -- as aforementioned -- was to proceed with its adjacent units.

The I Parachute Corps, adjoining the LXXVI Panzer Corps on the right, had the mission to ^(to such an extent) had been assigned the mission to push ahead ^(during) the night so that by gaining control of the east-west highway (Highway 82), it would be able to protect the right flank of the LXXVI Panzer Corps. For the protection of the left flank, ~~which was exposed in particular~~ which was exposed in particular the Corps took additional measures by moving a Panzer Battalion into a position of readiness to the rear of the left flank of the Division near the diagonal highway which ^(running toward) ~~was running~~ toward of TERRE DI PADIGLIONE.

Although the author was convinced of the need of ^(advancing the attack rapidly) ~~to~~, nevertheless he expressed his doubts to the Corps as to whether ~~it would be possible to succeed in launching~~ ^(jumping off to) ~~it would be possible to succeed in launching~~ a promising, well-organized attack at 0400, while still dark. The first reports to the regimental commanders confirmed this view: casualties among the reconnaissance and guide parties, difficulties in even reaching the battalions' and companies' command posts in the heavy artillery fire, confusion regarding the course of our own and enemy lines, etc., -- during all this time, ~~the~~ combat activity was in continuous progress. In addition, the approach routes, ravines, etc., were under constant artillery fire and consequently moving up of units was extremely difficult. Since in the course of the evening the Division's serious apprehensions with regard to the time of the attack were not heeded by higher headquarters, the Division and the Regiments continued to execute the order to the best of their ability, particularly in view of the fact that each commander

fully realized the necessity of speedily advancing the attack in this critical phase of the battle. Actually, the units arrived at the jump off position too late, -- partially due to more than just minor losses, being ripped ~~apart~~ apart by enemy fire as well as ^{by} confusion of friend and foe -- ~~added~~ that it was impossible to carry out a closed, well-organized attack at 0400. Enormous difficulties were encountered in the transmission of orders. Telephone lines were disrupted, radio sets failed to operate or operators became casualties, and in the strange terrain at night during enemy fire messengers required long periods of time and sometimes they failed in reaching their goals altogether. For that reason the Division commander ordered that at 0400 strong reconnaissance detachments were to clarify the enemy situation and that at 0600 the concentrated attack was to advance. (These facts were reported to the Commander in Chief of the Fourteenth Army who was present during the morning). Also by that time it would not have been possible for even a highly trained, thoroughly combat-experienced unit to have executed the plans -- in the situation described -- ~~including~~ ^{which included} scheduled, closely coordinated fire support of artillery and infantry weapons, ~~which~~ ^{which} would have been urgently necessary ~~in this combat situation.~~

The Division had only committed the 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to the front line and the main body of the 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment was disposed in depth to the rear as reserves.

No exact estimates can be made with reference to the number of tankers and assault guns which supported the attack owing to lack of data. Most of the tanks of the Division's Panzer Battalion, however, were committed to the headquarters of the Battalion in the area of the I Parachute Corps.

To the extent that I am able to call the fact to mind, (In the BUON RIPOSE area) ~~there was~~ a Panzer company and a ~~platoon~~ (fix

"Hornissen" platoon (?) [hornet, name of German self-propelled ~~AT~~ gun]

were detached to the Division ^{in return.} ~~and to the headquarters of the I Parachute Corps~~

The point of penetration was widened, to be sure, by the combined attack of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 26th Panzer Division and 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, however the attack obviously suffered because it had been impossible to make ample preparations. It was self-evident that at this particular time ^{the enemy} would have to defend every foot of ground stubbornly; foxholes had been constructed everywhere and our forces now were in the midst of the enemy's field fortifications. Well-fortified and stubbornly held enemy strong points were located near the group of houses, CLE L O'VILE, and in front of the left flank, approximately 1 km north of highway 82. The bulk of the enemy artillery was located only a few km ahead in the ^{in this vicinity} "Bosco di Padiglione" forest and ~~near~~ the German wedge of attack had also advanced very near to the ANZIO - NETTUNO harbors! Allied counterattacks were repulsed. On 18 February, the losses of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were considerable, approximately 35 percent of combat strength.

At 0400, 19 February, the attack ~~continued~~ continued in the same formation. (The statement in "Fifth Army History", page 143, concerning

~~the fact~~ that the 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment also had orders to attack

After a brief, heavy fire preparation by artillery and heavy
on 19 February is incorrect.) ~~The 1st and 2d (Jaeger) Battalions, 15th~~

~~Regiment Grenadier~~

infantry weapons, the 1st and 2d (Jaeger) Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment attacked ~~immediately~~ with force and determination and shortly
after daybreak had ~~reached~~ reached their objective -- highway 82 --
and ~~at various points~~ in fact had advanced beyond it at various
points.

During the night 17 - 18 February and on 18 February, the effects of newly
arrived enemy reinforcements were beginning to be felt.

adjacent

The situation in the ~~adjacent~~ unit on the left -- 114 th Jaeger
Division -- became critical as the result of a heavy enemy counterattack
with tank support, which began moving northwest early in the morning from
TERRE DI PADIOLONE. The elements of the 114th Jaeger Division adjoining on
the left were thrown back and the deep left flank of the 29th Panzer Grenadier
Division was seriously threatened. The Division moved the 71st Panzer
Grenadier Regiment up far enough so that ~~as~~ its forward battalion could be
committed ^(as flank) protection on the southeast front behind the 15th Regiment's
left flank.

The 15th Regiment assumed ~~the~~ responsibility for its own right flank
protection by committing two companies of its reserve battalions. ^{((11th Battalion, 15th Regiment))}
~~Both of the battalions of the 15th Regiment which had been inserted at the~~
front and had attacked with such marked success, now encountered serious

difficulties. Heavy artillery fire was directed against these battalions and the terrain directly behind the front to such a degree that it was no longer possible to maintain any kind of contact in this open, almost coverless terrain. The battalions eventually -- in so far as I can recall -- reported by radio at approximately 0900 that they would resume the attack just as soon as the artillery fire died down. (The objective was BOSCE DI PADIOLIONE.) No further reports came in. Contact via telephone, radio, messenger or officers had by now become impossible. Finally it could only be ~~data~~ established through officers -- to the extent that they returned -- and a few wounded who succeeded in returning, that both battalions had entrenched themselves in foxholes and houses along highway 82. ~~Maximum~~

~~attempts to move up tanks and assault guns were made but failed~~

~~and unrelentingly failed~~

Moreover, despite the fact that they were pursued ~~the soggy, swampy terrain~~ ~~the fact that they were pursued~~ vigorously and unrelentingly, all attempts to move up tanks and assault guns in order to aid the battalions failed owing to the soggy, swampy terrain. The intention to move up these battalions, initially via the north - south highway (ALBANE - ANZIO) and then on the east - west highway was not feasible because the adjacent unit on the right had not succeeded in taking highway 82. Attempts to push vigorously forward on the diagonal highway (toward TERRE DI PADIOLIONE) and then branch off to the right failed also because -- as I recall -- a bridge had been blown up. Consequently the remaining

elements of the two valiant battalions ^(finally) succumbed to the enemy's armored supported attack which was launched from TERRE DI PADIGLIONE and from the south and west during the afternoon.

The front line, now adjoining the left flank of the 36th Panzer Division, ran to the east since it was not possible to hold the highway as long as the adjacent units were not also in possession of it.

~~The day was marked in all the other sectors of the Division along both sides of the north-south highway by fierce counterattacks by the Allies. Enemy artillery fire was also intense.~~

The day was marked by the fierce Allied counterattacks in every other sector of the Division along both sides of the north - south highway. Enemy artillery fire as well as the incessant commitment of bombers and fighters attained a new high that day, and ~~caused~~ caused heavy losses. Our own attacks were stopped and terrain recently gained was partially lost again.

Through the engagement of enemy reinforcements which had arrived, ~~seen~~ particularly the very heavy artillery units, the battle resulted in a decisive victory for the Allies. "Fifth Army History" makes mention of the ~~fact that~~ concentration of fire by eight British field artillery regiments and eight corps artillery battalions. It was no longer possible to achieve the desired breakthrough. The Division did not resume the attack on 20 February. On the other hand, the adjacent unit on the left advanced and regained so much ground that ~~the~~ danger to the Division's left flank was reduced. The ^(adjoining) adjacent units

Panzer Battalion assisted in the mopping up process.

The attack which had been effected with strong forces and accompanied with high expectations did not attain its objective. Causes for its failure will be viewed briefly in the latter part of this study.

Higher headquarters had decided on a second attack from the CISTERNA area. As a result of the continuous rainy weather, entry into the assembly area -- particularly for heavy weapons -- was connected with many difficulties in the deeply mired terrain. The armored units were now actually no longer able to leave the highways and roads. The attack, which was carried out on 29 February by the 114th Jaeger Division, 362d Infantry Division, 26th Panzer Division and the "Hermann Goering" Panzer Division under the ~~XXXXXX~~ LXXVI Panzer Corps, was able to attain only meager success, which for the most part was lost again in the ensuing counterattacks.

The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, in accordance to Tenth Army Headquarters, was to attack again in the CISTERNA ISOLABELLA --it had been pulled out of the APRILIA Front during the night of 27-28 February and transferred to the area south of CORI as Army reserves -- however, this plan was dropped since orders had been given suspending the attack.

The intention of eliminating the beachhead meanwhile had been given up by higher headquarters. However, a number of carefully prepared, small-scale attacks were to be effected in order to narrow down the beachhead area as much as possible or to improve our own positions.

The Division was then transferred to the CISTERNA-VELLETRI area as an Army reserve unit, and subsequently to the ROCCA DI PAPA - LACE ALBANO area.

In accordance to the plans at that time, it was to have been committed once more in an attack ~~with~~ with a minor objective in the BUON-RIPOSO area.

This operation "Silberstreifen" was to have brought Highway 82 into our hands.

The unit was trained especially for this mission, primarily in fighting in ravines and a number of times with live ammunition. Preparations for these

assignments were made with the commanders and noncommissioned officers by

going over them at the sand table. Reconnaissance ~~of the zone of attack~~

was made of the zone of attack, and the organization and manner of attack

were determined. Shortly before the fixed deadline the attack was called off.

Causes for the Failure of the Attack.

Failure of the attack which had started with such high expectations by ~~the higher headquarters~~ higher headquarters and the unit was a big disappointment. A victory had been desired not only for military but also for political reasons. Naturally, both the command and the unit had their own ideas as to the causes for the failure. On this basis OKW (Wehrmacht High Command) ordered a Division commander, a number of Regimental and Battalion commanders and several Company commanders to report to Hitler on the OBERSALZBERG (7 March 1944). The author was appointed to go as the Division commander.

The decisive causes were:

1. The complete air superiority of the Allies.
2. The fire superiority of enemy artillery, including naval guns.
3. The fact that it was impossible for us to commit our heavy armored forces at the critical time because owing to the soft, swampy ground, travel off the highways and hard-surfaced roads was not feasible to any extent.

It may be stated that in the final analysis the Allied air superiority and our own complete lack of air power decided the issue. ~~if our Luftwaffe had been~~ If our Luftwaffe had been ~~approximately~~ equally strong, it would not have been possible for the Allies to accomplish the following:

- a. Employ cruisers and transports for combat and movement of supplies ~~without encountering~~ with only little interference.
- b. Land reinforcements on 17-18 February and ~~commit them to the front~~ insert them at the front.
- c. Commit heavy artillery with ~~such~~ ^{such vast} expenditure of ammunition.
- d. Keep their artillery observation planes in the air almost uninterruptedly and through their assistance bring about such heavy losses of our own artillery.
- e. Cause ~~such~~ ^{the} heavy casualties of personnel, horses and vehicles by fighter bombers in our infantry, artillery and supply units -- in both front and rear areas.
- f. In conclusion orient themselves to the last detail regarding events on and behind the German front (~~instead~~ In fact all our activity was ~~concentrated~~

revealed as in an open book to the enemy since ~~it was possible to~~
~~its~~ its reconnaissance was conducted with practically no interference
 whatever).

~~With the aid of~~

It would thus have been possible to wipe out the enemy's artillery superiority
 (including the naval guns) and increase the effect of our own artillery. In
 that event, the attack would have succeeded even without the complete support of
 armored forces. In substantiation thereof, mention is made of the fact that
 only ten percent of our killed and wounded can be traced to the action of
 enemy infantry weapons, whereas almost 75 percent were casualties of artillery
 fire and approximately 15 percent ~~in~~ of enemy air force activity.

During the report to Hitler, at which time General Jodl was present,
~~the author brought out~~
 the author ~~brought out~~ opened the discussion with remarks approximately as stated in the
 preceding paragraphs. Since the main topic of the report concerned the
 excellent ~~coordination between enemy artillery air observers and~~ coordination between enemy artillery air observers and
 their own
 artillery and the resulting disastrous effects on our artillery in particular,
 as well as ~~the measures taken against the enemy observation planes,~~ the measures taken against the enemy observation planes,
 the author
 in response to Hitler's ~~immediate~~ objections stated that no decisive success
 was achieved through commitment of our flak. Hitler's reply was: "In other
 words, you believe we should have fighters?" The question could only be
 answered emphatically in the affirmative. Thus on the whole it was plainly
 a matter of insufficient air power.

At that time an additional explanation offered -- at some points no definite opinion could be voiced due to lack of sufficient experience at the front -- was to the effect that the failure could be traced to the low morale of the infantry. That was a completely erroneous construction of facts. ~~At that time~~ The author objected vigorously to such an interpretation at the time. ~~Naturally the ability to effect a penetration during the fifth year of the conflict was not the same as at the outbreak of the war.~~ In view of the high rate of attrition and the terrific strain, the frequently insufficient training of replacements, the lowering of requirements as to degree of fitness of manpower, etc., naturally the ability to effect a penetration during the fifth year of the conflict was not the same as at the outbreak of the war. No explanation is necessary. However, the unit did put forth its utmost effort. For that very reason it needed the ~~the~~ support of the Luftwaffe and heavy weapons all the more. In our case this assistance had disappeared as well, that is to say, aid from the Luftwaffe was totally lacking and in that manner -- as has just been mentioned -- support through heavy weapons and tanks was also lowered. Consequently, regardless of the fact that every arm of service fulfilled its obligations at its post, nevertheless failures were bound to occur in the face of an enemy who had unlimited resources and whose air force, heavy weapons and armored units were constantly increasing in number. Even the most superior infantry force is no longer able to advance if is being ~~smashed~~ smashed

by massed artillery fire and air attacks.

In this connection mention should also be made of the fact that the shifting of attacking units at the point of main effort during the night of 17 - 18 February -- at a time when it was essential that the attack advance with all speed -- certainly had an unfavorable effect. If the newly inserted Divisions, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and 26th Panzer Division, simply could have attacked beyond the Divisions which up to now had carried the assault, as in mobile warfare, then no doubt they would have been able to break through as far as the area of the Allied artillery positions (BOSCO DI PADIOLIONE) before the Allies would have had time to commit their reinforcements. However through no fault incurred by these Divisions, the attack was interrupted for the reasons aforementioned which permitted the enemy time to strengthen his resistance and even allow him to assume the offensive. The Divisions which were committed initially were no longer capable of carrying on the assault in the night of 17 - 18 February following the two previous days of heavy combat.

Effects of the Failure

It was previously stated that both command and unit were disappointed as a result of the failure; they did not feel, however that they had contributed to this failure. The causes which in part had also been decisive at SALERNO ~~again~~ showed up ^{again} with distinct clarity in the battle for the beachhead and offered no encouragement for the future. The approaching

invasion in France was viewed with apprehension, ~~and the question was~~
~~whether we would be able to repel it.~~
 and the question prevalent was whether we would be able to repel it. In the
 event the attempt failed, then there certainly was grave danger that it would
 not be possible to push the enemy back into the sea.

Another study will provide the relevant data in regard to the effects
 of the failure on the all-over strategy ~~effort~~ in Italy. Within the scope of
 this study, it is only to be noted how the increased strain of the troops
 in the time to come was connected with the effects of the failures. The
 front line was actually lengthened since the Allies had not been able to
 execute any operations from the beachhead and consequently also had not
 been able to attain their objective. We needed an additional number of
 divisions. The chances of being relieved became constantly lower ~~decreased further~~ while the
 demands on the troops were higher than ever before. However, the unit
 continued to perform its difficult task.

The casualties ~~for the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division~~ in the beachhead
 fighting were the heaviest in the entire Italian campaign for the 29th
 Panzer Grenadier Division. Nevertheless, the Division afterward had the
 rare good fortune to recuperate, ~~during the rehabilitation period~~ from
 the exertion of the battle of ~~material~~, which placed an especially heavy
 strain on the nerves, during the rehabilitation period and prepare itself
 for future difficult commitment.

(signed) WALTER FRIES